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HOPE OVER EXPERIENCE: MANDATORY
INFORMAL DISCOVERY AND THE
POLITICS OF RULEMAKING
LINDA S. MULLENIX*
Within the next few years, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules will
revise severalprovisions of the existingformal discovery rules, andprobably will propose a new informal discovery rule. The purpose of these
amendments is to addressonce again the problems of discovery abuse by
reducing the need and expense offormal discovery. ProfessorLinda S.
Mullenix discusses the originalproposed version of an informal discovery rule, presenting both the advantages and potential drawbacks of
such a rule. More importantly, Professor Mullenix uses this proposed
rule to examine the increasingpoliticizationof the civil rulemakingprocess. The Article traces the change in the Advisory Committee from an
elitistrulemaking body subject to little public participationto a pluralistic committee that is now subject to public participationat all stages of
rulemaking. Mullenix predicts that, as a result of this change, partisan
law reformers increasingly will look to influence the rulemakingprocess,
ratherthan the judicialarena, to bring aboutsocial change. The Article
concludes that this politicization may lead to ineffective or nonexistent
rulemaking. In addition, the change also may signal the decline of the
Advisory Committee's role as a proceduralrule-drafting body and the
predominanceof more politically responsive rulemaking bodies, such as
congressionalcommittees with rulemaking oversight.
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A body of law that reflects no political agenda, has no apparent
special consequence for any substantive interest group, and merely
equips our courts to do their work largely according to theirown lights is
not the materialof which political controversy is generally made. Thus
it is that no Civil Rule or amendment to a Civil Rule finding its way up
the rulemaking ladder has ever evoked political activity by any group
organized around an interest extrinsic to the proceduralsystem. Nor is
it likely, or even imaginable, that such an amendment would move
through the existing system in the absence ofdrasticchange in the premisesfrom which all of our proceduralrulemaking proceeds.1
INTRODUCTION: THE RULES OF THE GAME

Within the next few years, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 2 is going
to promulgate a new rule of civil procedure requiring informal discovery.3 In
1. ProposedDeletion of Supersession Provision by the Rules EnablingActAmendments of 1988:
Hearings on H.R. 3152 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
Justice ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1260-61 (1987) [hereinafter Hearings on HR. 3152: Carrington Statement] (statement of Paul D. Carrington, Dean,
School of Law, Duke University). Professor Carrington's views regarding the rulemaking process
largely are repeated in Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose ofManifestly UnfoundedAssertions: An
Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-SubstantiveRules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2067,
2067-87 (1989) [hereinafter Carrington, MakingRules]. See also Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules EnablingAct, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 281-326 (1989) [hereinafter Carrington,

"Substance" and "Procedure' (examining the meanings of "substance" and "procedure" in evaluating the power of the supersession clause of the Rules Enabling Act). For a response to Professor
Carrington's views on the rulemaking process, see Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul
Carrington's"Substance" and "Procedure"in the Rules EnablingAct, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012 (1989).
Commenting on the failure of efforts to repeal the supersession clause of the Rules Enabling Act,
Burbank observes:
Nonetheless, I believe that Professor Carrington has invited us to the wrong celebration
and there is reason to doubt whether any celebration is in order. Having engaged Professor
Carrington's views on generalism, judicial discretion and political neutrality elsewhere, I
find his views on rulemaking power no more analytically satisfying, no more faithful to the
facts, and no more reassuring.
Id. at 1015.
2. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules is one committee of the Judicial Conference of'the
United States. It consists of 12 members and a Reporter, appointed by the Chief Justice of the
United States to serve as chairman of the Judicial Conference. The current committee consists of
two circuit court judges, three district court judges, one United States magistrate, one state court
justice, one Justice Department attorney, two practitioners, and two law professors. The Advisory
Committee Reporter also is a law professor. On the structure of the rulemaking committee system,
see W. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILmEs 5-34 (1981); Hearingson
H.R. 3152: Carrington Statement, supra note 1, at 1251-66; Carrington, Making Rules, supra note 1,
at 2069-87, 2119 app. See generally Mars, Federal ProceduralRule-Making: The Program of the
JudicialConference, 47 A.B.A. J. 772 (1961) (discussing the history of judicial rulemaking and the
roles of the Judicial Conference and its advisory committees in reviewing the Federal Civil, Criminal, Admiralty, Bankruptcy, and Appellate rules); The Rule-Making Functionand the Judicial Conference of the United States, 21 F.R.D. 117, 117 (1958) (evaluating the Judicial Conference's
proposal that Congress adopt "a revision in the procedure of rulemaking for the federal courts").
3. See FED. R. Civ. P. 25.1 (Proposed Drafts Feb. 24, 1990 & Mar. 8, 1990) (entitled "Prompt
Disclosure of Evidence"). The proposed rule bears the notation "Reporter's Draft Not Intended for
Public Discussion." See infra text accompanying note 321. At the November 16, 1989, meeting of
the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, the Reporter expressed his discomfort
with early circulation of proposed draft rules, indicating that early drafts were circulated to a short
list of interested academicians and others known to the Reporter. The Reporter expressed his desire
not to have draft rules subject to widespread distribution and comment at the early draft stages of
formulation. He indicated that it was his intention to continue the practice of clearly labelling pro-
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essence, this rule will formalize a practice currently used by many practicing

lawyers to ease the exchange of documents and information, without recourse to
the formal civil discovery provisions. 4 As the draft Reporter's Note suggests,
the new rule "embodies the idea that parties should disclose their own evidence

early and often." 5 The goal of the informal discovery rule is to reduce the necesof which "would depend on
sity and expense of formal discovery, achievement
'6
an elevation of the professionalism of lawyers."
At its best, the new informal discovery rule would mandate easy and open

discovery, the same goals of the 1938 formal discovery provisions that often
have proven elusive and aspirational. 7 At its worst, the new informal discovery8
provision may prove to be yet another barnacle on the civil discovery rules,
honored more in form than in substance. Viewed moderately, the proposed informal discovery rule is a harmless accretion that will require litigators to jump

through another procedural hoop on the road to trial. However construed, the
proposed informal discovery rule is innocent, neutral, bland, and boring-as all
good procedural rules should be.

It is fascinating, then, to watch this totally innocuous rule become the staging ground for a much more interesting phenomenon-the politicization of the
posed rule texts as "Reporter's Draft Not Intended for Public Discussion." The Reporter's stated
preference for nondisclosure at early drafting stages suggests a tension within the open rulemaking
process contemplated in 28 U.S.C.A. § 2073 (1990). See infra notes 15-16; see also Carrington,
Making Rules, supra note 1, 2067 app. at 2121 n.18 (discussing the problems with premature comments on draft rule revisions). The discussion in this Article of proposed rule 25.1 analyzes the
Reporter's drafts of that rule. This discussion recognizes that the proposed rule has not yet been
endorsed by the members of the Advisory Committee, nor has it been circulated for public comment.
4. See FED. R. Civ. P. 25.1 Reporter's Note (Proposed Draft Feb. 24, 1990). The Reporter's
Note indicates that some of the proposed rule's language and provisions are derived from similar
local rules of court in the Southern District of New York, the Central District of California, and the
Southern District of Florida. Guam also has a mandatory informal discovery rule. D. GUAM R.
235-5; see infra note 105. For a discussion of particular provisions of proposed rule 25.1, see infra
notes 31-59 and accompanying text.
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 25.1 Reporter's Note (Proposed Draft Feb. 24, 1990).
6. Id. The Reporter's Note indicates that the basic idea for a mandatory informal discovery
rule is derived from Brazil, The Adversary Characterof Civil Discovery: A Critique andProposalsfor
Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1296, 1348-61 (1978). Professor Brazil is now a United States judge
magistrate in the Northern District of California and a current member of the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules.
7. See Brazil, supra note 6, at 1299-1303.
8. See, eg., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f). This discovery conference provision was added to rule 26
in 1980 as "the principal surviving product of the proposals in 1977 by a special committee of the
Section of Litigation of the American Bar Association concerned with abuses in discovery, although
even this proposal was modified before it was finally adopted." 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTrCE AND PROCEDURE § 2051 (Supp. 1990). This provision for a discovery conference
manifests a desire by the rulemakers to provide a means for discovery control, but it is to a great
extent redundant with amended rule 16 on pretrial conferences. Current rule 26(f) is in many ways
a forerunner of the new proposed rule 25.1. Rule 26(f)'s fifth provision requires a statement from
the attorneys that they have made a reasonable effort with opposing counsel regarding the discovery
matter prior to requesting a conference with the court. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f). Little is known about
practice under rule 26(f), especially concerning how often this discovery mechanism is invoked, in
what circumstances, and to what result. Its continuing vitality is problematic in conjunction with
the new proposed rule 25.1, although there is no reason why the possibility of discovery conferences
should not continue to be available under the rules. In sum, rule 26(f) is a reminder of the repeated
efforts of the rule drafters to curb discovery abuse. The discovery provisions resemble an archaeological dig, layered with eras of well-intentioned procedural reform.
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civil rulemaking process. Until now, the civil rulemaking process has been a
relatively benign and obscure function of the Judicial Conference of the United

States. 9 Traditionally, the rulemaking process of the Advisory Committees10

has been largely the work of a small group of judges, lawyers, and academicians. 1 1 The work of the Advisory Committee has been subject to virtually no
public or professional interest, 12 inducing widespread ennui. In truth, few law-

yers (and certainly fewer nonlawyers) know or care about the judicial rulemaking process.
The professional torpor in the civil rulemaking process is now about to
change. In 1988 Congress passed the Judicial Improvements and Access to Jus-

tice Act, 13 an omnibus bill incorporating numerous modifications into the procedural rules.'

4

One of the reforms in this legislation is a provision permitting

greater public access to the civil rulemaking processes of the Advisory Committees. 15 In essence, what previously had gone on behind closed doors is now open
9. See W. BROWN, supra note 2, at 5-8; see also Clark, The Role of the Supreme Court in
FederalRule-Making, 46 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 250, 253-54 (1963) (providing an historical background
of the Conference's role in federal rulemaking); Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power ofthe Supreme
Court: A Contemporary Crisis,27 STAN. L. REv. 673 (1975) (discussing the unfettered role of judges
in the rulemaking process and congressional response); Lesnick, The FederalRule-Making Process:
A Time for Re-examination, 61 A.B.A. J. 579 (1975) (proposing that Congress and the Judicial
Conference re-examine and revamp the rulemaking process); Lewis, The Excessive History ofFederal
Rule 15(c) and Its Lessonsfor Civil Rules Revision, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 1507, 1509-11 (1987) (briefly
surveying the traditional role of the court and Congress in federal civil rulemaking); Wheeler, Broadening Participationin the Courts Through Rule-Making and Administration, 62 JUDICATURE 281,
282-83 (1979) (describing the "relatively simple" federal rulemaking process); Wright, Procedural
Reform: Its Limitationsand Its Future, 1 GA. L. REv. 563, 565-66 (1967) (noting the apparently
smooth operation of "procedural reform" within the federal system).
10. The Judicial Conference drafts, reviews, and promulgates rules through four standing committees: civil, criminal, appellate, and bankruptcy. For a discussion of the structure and processes
of this committee system, see W. BROWN, supra note 2, at 5-35.
11. Id. For criticisms of the restrictive participatory nature of this rulemaking structure and
processes, see id at 35-102; Lesnick, supra note 9, at 580-83; Lewis, supra note 9, at 1557-73;
Wheeler, supra note 9, at 282-88.
12. A notable exception to this general lack of interest occurred in relation tothe promulgation
of evidence rules revisions in 1972, which generated widespread criticism of the rulemaking process.
See generally W. BROWN, supra note 2, at 2-3, 35-102 (discussing criticism of the rulemaking process

and structure and of the content of the rules themselves as influenced by the judicial-legislative

relationship); Lesnick, supra note 9, at 579 (observing that congressional preemption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence gave Congress time to review the rules but challenged the "vitality" of the
rulemaking process itself).
13. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. IV, 102 Stat.
4642 (1988) [hereinafter "Judicial Improvements Act"].
14. Among the reforms was an increase in jurisdictional amount to $50,000 for diversity cases,
id. § 201; the treatment of resident aliens as citizens for diversity purposes, id. § 203; changes relating to citizenship in estates cases, id. § 202; venue over corporations, id. § 1013; and removal jurisdiction, id. § 1016. Congress simplified the basic authorization for the Rules Enabling Act. See 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1988). See generally Judicial Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. IV, 102
Stat. 4642 (Nov. 19, 1988) (Title IV makes several changes regarding public accessibility to meetings, records, and documents).
15. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073-2074 (1989); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c)(1)-(2), (d). These subsections provide:
(c)(1) Each meeting for the transaction of business under this chapter by any committee appointed under this section shall be open to the public, except when the committee
so meeting, in open session and with a majority present, determines that it is; in the public
interest that all or part of the remainder of the meeting on that day shall be closed to the
public, and states the reason for so closing the meeting. Minutes of each meeting for the
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to enhanced public participation and scrutiny at the earliest stages of judicial
rule formation. 16 Participatory democracy now is emerging in the rulemaking
17
process.
This minor shift in process has gone largely unnoticed, except by a small

group of procedural inside players. 18 Yet the implications of this change may
prove more dramatic than its congressional drafters anticipated. American pluralistic theory proceeds on the premise that participatory democracy is a good
thing, 19 from which one could infer that it is impossible to have too much of a
good thing. The ultimate issue raised by the recent rulemaking reform, how20
ever, is an old one: who should make the rules?

While imbued with imposing philosophical overtones, 2 1 the problem of procedural rulemaking is also rife with complex subsidiary issues. Is judicial
rulemaking really a "legislative" function and, if so, should rule-drafting then be
subject to the full-dress legislative process, including witness hearings and interest group lobbying? Who should be heard and when? What does it mean to be
transaction of business under this chapter shall be maintained by the committee and made
available to the public, except that any portion of such minutes, relating to a closed meeting and made available to the public, may contain such deletions as may be necessary to
avoid frustrating the purposes of closing the meeting.
(2) Any meeting for the transaction of business under this chapter, by a committee appointed under this section, shall be preceded by sufficient notice to enable all interested persons to attend.
(d) In making a recommendation under this section or under section 2072, the body
making that recommendation shall provide a proposed rule, an explanatory note on the
rule, and a written report explaining the body's action, including any minority or other
separate views.
16. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2072 (1989). These provisions on the rulemaking power do not provide the specific authorization for open and public participation that §§ 2073-2074 now supply.
17. See generally Hazard, Undemocratic Legislation (Book Review), 87 YALE L.J. 1284 (1978)
(in this review of 1. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES (1977), Hazard
criticizes participatory civil rulemaking).
18. See CourtReform and Access to Justice Act: Hearingson H.R. 3152 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm, on the Judiciary,
100th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., at 3-450 (1987-88) (witness statements); id. at 1249-1368 (Appendix

III-Materials Relating to Specific Court Reform Issues, sec. 4.: Rules Enabling Act) [hereinafter
Court Reform andAccess to Justice Act: Hearings on H.R. 3152].
19. For the classic study of American pluralism, see R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY
AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1961). For a criticism of pluralistic theory, see T. LOWi, THE
END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY (1969).
20. See W. BROWN, supra note 2, at 36-37. Brown writes: "The nature of the rulemaking
process has been analyzed in detail, particularly at several critical periods in its development and
exercise. The literature deals with several issues: the sources and the location of the power, the
question of who can best exercise the power, and the nature of the process itself." Id. (footnote
omitted); see also Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A ProposalFor Restricted Field Experiments, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 67-85 (Summer 1988) (proposing increased empirical studies of federal procedural rules to assist in rule promulgation, amendment, and reform).
21. The general problem of rulemaking as a subset of law-giving is as old as humanity. See THE
REPUBLIC OF PLATO, PART III (BOOKS V. 471c-VII): THE PHILOSOPHER KING (F. Comford
trans. 1945); THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE (Books III and IV) (Barker ed. 1969).
Professor Carrington has suggested that the rulemaking process resembles nothing so much as a
Rawlsian exercise in decisionmaking from behind the "veil of ignorance." See Carrington, Making
Rules, supra note 1, at 2079 (quoting J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971)). Professor
Carrington also suggests an historical lineage for current rulemaking norms derived from Roscoe
Pound, David Dudley Field, Henry Brougham, Jeremy Bentham, and Max Weber. Id. at 2077-78
(authorities cited at notes therein).
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"heard" in the rule-drafting process? Does it matter if the judicial rulemaking
process becomes politicized? Has the judicial rulemaking process ever not been
politicized?
The purpose of this Article is twofold. First, the Article describes the new
proposed informal discovery rule and its genesis. As a departure from existing
civil discovery practice, this proposed rule deserves explanation and analysis
contemporaneous with its promulgation. Second, and perhaps more importantly, this Article describes the rule-drafting process involved in creating the
proposed informal discovery rule. The purpose of this discussion is to focus
attention on the increased politicization of the civil rulemaking process and to
assess the benefits and dangers involved in politicization.
This Article has three theses. First, partisan law reformers have abandoned
the judicial arena as the forum for achieving social change, 22 and instead are
focusing legal reform efforts on the rules and the rulemaking process. Sensing
the demise of judicial activism, social reformists have shifted strategy to the
rulemaking process. This tactical repositioning is interesting because it reflects a
belief on the part of many partisan advocates that all substantive law is procedurally driven. As every five-year-old knows, the kid who gets to make the rules
of the game has the greatest chance of winning. If this is what this shift signals,
then the Advisory Committee faces increased challenges to its rule reform efforts
that result in procedural rules that expand, modify, or amend the substantive
law, 23 as prohibited by the Rules Enabling Act.24
Second, opening the rulemaking process at the earliest stages of rule promulgation will politicize the rulemaking process as never before, with perhaps
worrisome consequences. Either the Advisory Committee will create vacuous,
ineffective rules that are the result of political compromise, or the Committee
will fail to effectuate any rule reform, becoming bogged down in endless stalemate, delay, and legislative paralysis. Even more troubling, the Committee in
the future may face charges of unresponsive rulemaking if it fails to consider
various new constituent concerns.
Third, the inevitable politicization of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee
foreshadows the decline of that body's role in procedural rule-drafting. The partisan rule reformers will realize quickly that the Advisory Committee, by its
nature,2 5 is an ineffectual forum in which to lobby for rule reform. Not only is
22. See, e.g., Collins &Skover, The Future of LiberalLegal Scholarship, 87 MICH. L. Rav. 189,
203 (1988) ("But the emergence of a more conservative judiciary alone demands that liberal scholars

reorient their efforts away from a frustrating dialogue with the federal bench and toward some, as
yet, unidentified new approaches."). See generally Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 270 (1989) (critical of the traditional judicial
rulemaking process and its underlying trans-substantive philosophy of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
23. Id. See generally 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 8, § 1001 (1987) (discussing the

allocation of power to regulate procedure between the legislature and the judiciary).
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988) ("Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any sub-

stantive right.").
25. For a discussion of the deliberative review processes of the Advisory Committees, see W.
BROWN, supra note 2, at 5-25, 132. See also 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 8, §§ 1001-08
(1987) (summarizing the history of procedural rulemaking in the federal courts).
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the Advisory Committee painfully slow, deliberative, and dull, but its Article III
judges have little incentive to bend to political will. Hence, the partisan rule
reformers eventually will abandon the Advisory Committee and take their
causes to other rulemaking bodies,
namely the congressional committees with
26
federal rulemaking oversight.
The demise of the influence of the Advisory Committee in judicial rulemaking will place procedural reform in Congress's hands. What cannot be accomplished in the Advisory Committee-effective legislative lobbying-will be
accomplished quite effectively in congressional committees. There, the full
brunt of participatory democracy will come to bear in the rulemaking process.
The questions, of course, are whether it is desirable for congressional committees
to draft procedural rules and for current legislative processes to inform procedural rules.
This Article discusses these three theses in three sections. Part I first describes the provisions of the proposed informal discovery rule. Next, it discusses
the basis for the proposed rule, as well as experience with similar informal discovery rules. Part II then examines the criticism and opposition to the proposed
informal discovery rule as an illustration of the nascent politicization of the
drafting process and the sources of this politicization. Finally, Part III explores
the broad questions of participatory rulemaking and implications for the future
of the traditional judicial rulemaking bodies.
This Article, then, contrasts abstract theories of rulemaking with the political realities of legislative politics. In essence, what is being played out is a contemporary version of Jean Renoir's classic movie, The Rules of the Game.
There, the brutalities of World War I caused the remaining French nobility to
witness the demise of their genteel, civilized world. The Advisory Committee
has enjoyed this aura of the Old Guard-of genteel, deliberative rulemaking.
Now, the rules of the game are changing and the question remains open whether
the Advisory Committee is destined to go the way of the French aristocracy.
I.

THE INFORMAL DISCOVERY RULE:

A

CASE STUDY IN THE NEW

RULEMAKING PROCESS

The Advisory Committee's Proposed Rule 25.1, Prompt Disclosure of Evi26. In general, the Advisory Committees submit promulgated rules to the Supreme Court,
which in turn submits the rules to Congress. W. BROWN, supra note 2, at 32. When Congress
receives rules from the Court, it refers them to the appropriate judiciary committees for consideration. Id. Until 1973, Congress could allow the rules to become law by inaction. Independent of the
Advisory Committee and Supreme Court, Congress may enact federal rules. Id. at 33; see also
Judicial Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. IV, 102 Stat. 4649-50 (Nov. 19, 1989) (illustrating the process of congressionally enacted civil rule reform). Much of the reform takes place in
congressional committees. The relevant House committees are the Committee on the Judiciary and
its Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice. CONGRESSIONAL
STAFF DIRECTORY 282 (A. Brownson ed. 1990). In the Senate, the Committee on the Judiciary has
six subcommittees with jurisdiction over various rulemaking matters. Id. at 281-83. The Senate
Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice has jurisdiction over court administration and
management; judicial rules and procedures; creation of new courts and judgeships; bankruptcy; administrative practices and procedures; tort reform and liability issues; and private relief bills other
than immigration. Id. at 282.
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dence, 27 is the result of efforts by some Advisory Committee members to reform
the discovery process to reduce discovery disputes, cost, and delay. The Committee envisions the rule as a partial discovery reform, accompanied by other
rule modifications limiting the number of interrogatories, and the number and
duration of depositions. 28 "Its purpose," states the current Advisory Committee
Reporter, "is to materially reduce the cost of discovery before trial." 29
The aspirational goals of the Advisory Committee are important in light of
the subsequent politicization of this seemingly innocent rule change. The Reporter states that:

Discovery practice has become encumbered with excess motion practice and other papers to such an extent that Rules 26 - 37 are no longer
consonant with the aims of the rules stated in Rule 1. It is the aim of
this rule to eliminate much of the excess paper by calling upon the
professional responsibility of the bar to substitute informal30methods of

exchanging information for more costly formal methods.

Notwithstanding this goal, this reformist urge that would require informal dis-

covery has taken on a surprisingly more sinister cast in the views of some critics.
A. Proposed Rule 25.1: Prompt Disclosure of Evidence
The first version of the proposed informal discovery rule, drafted during
late 1989, contained five provisions. The first provision defined the litigant's
duty to disclose information to every other party. The rule would have required

a litigant to disclose in writing information about witnesses a party expected to

32
call at trial; 31 any expert opinion the disclosing party intended to offer at trial;

27. FED. R. CIrv. P. 25.1 (Proposed Drafts Feb. 24, 1990 and Mar. 8, 1990); see infra text
accompanying note 321.

28. Id. Reporter's Note (Proposed Draft Mar. 8, 1990). The Reporter's Note outlined the proposed rule's emphasis as follows:
This draft contemplates significant revisions in the discovery rules occasioned by the re-

duced reliance on discovery to secure information. Except by leave of court, interrogatories would be limited in number, perhaps to a number as small as five or ten. Depositions
would be presumptively limited in both number and length.
Id.
29.
30.
31.
the first

Id. advisory committee note (Proposed Draft Feb. 24, 1990).
Id.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 25.1(a)(1) (Proposed Draft Feb. 24, 1990). The proposed language of
draft reads as follows:
(a) Duty to Disclose; Scope. To secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of the action, each party has a duty promptly to disclose in writing to every other
party:
(1) the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of any witnesses that the
disclosing party expects to call at trial either to prove any fact alleged by that party or to
disprove any fact alleged by an opposing party, with'a summary of the facts to which each
witness might be called to testify;
Id. The March 8, 1990 draft rule retitled section (a) "Prompt Disclosure" and renumbered the
above section (a) as new subsection (1) of(a). The March revision also eliminated the requirement of
disclosure in writing. The above subsection (1) was redenominated as a new subsection (a). In
addition, the March revision of the proposed rule eliminated the requirement of a summary of facts
to which each witness might be called to testify. See FED. R. Civ. P. 25.1 (Proposed Draft Mar. 8,
1990).
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damages computations alleged by the disclosing party; 33 and the existence, location, custodian, and general description of any tangible evidence or relevant documents that the disclosing party planned to use at trial.3 4 The Reporter's Note
indicates that the materials required to be disclosed under this provision would
have been materials usually obtained under formal discovery requests (such as
by interrogatory or deposition), and so proper exchange of information under
the proposed rule would have "materially reduced" the need for resort to such
traditional discovery methods. 35 The Reporter's Note also carefully indicates
that under the proposed rule a party would not have been required to disclose
voluntarily information the party would not be using at trial: "Discovery will
therefore continue to be important as a means of securing from a party evidence
that is needed by the discovering party to establish that party's own claims or
' 36
defenses."

The second provision would have defined the time frame for mandatory
informal disclosure of the required materials. This draft of the proposed rule
required the parties to disclose "as fully as then possible" within twenty-one
days after filing an answer to a complaint. 37 The rule would have allowed the
court to shorten or extend this time and would have required that all disclosures
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 25.1(a)(2) (Proposed Draft Feb. 24, 1990). This section would require
disclosure of
any expert opinion that the disclosing party intends to offer at trial, with a summary of the
basis for any such opinion and of the qualifications of any witness expected to present it,
including a list of all prior expert appearances by that witness that have occurred within
the preceding three years.
Id.
This subsection was eliminated from the March 8, 1990 revised Reporter's Draft rule. See
FED. R.Civ. P. 25.1 (Proposed Draft Mar. 8, 1990).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 25.1(a)(3) (Proposed Draft Feb. 24, 1990). This provision would require
disclosure of "the computation of any category of damage alleged by the disclosing party, and the
documents or testimony on which such a computation is based." Id.
This subsection became new subsection (a)(1)(C) in the March 8, 1990 version of the proposed
rule. See FED. R. Civ. P. 25.1(a)(1)(C) (Proposed Draft Mar. 8, 1990).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 25.1(a)(4) (Proposed Draft Feb. 24, 1990). This would have required disclosure of "the existence, location, custodian, and general description of any tangible evidence or
relevant documents, including pertinent insurance agreements or information of a similar nature,
that the disclosing party plans to use at trial." Id.
This subsection was retained in the March 8, 1990, revision of the proposed rule, but was redenominated as subsection (a)(1)(D). It also was reworded to state: "the existence and contents of any
insurance agreement under which any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to
satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for
payments made to satisfy the judgment." FED R. CIv. P. 25.1 (Proposed Draft Mar. 8, 1990).
35. See id. Reporter's Note (Proposed Draft Feb. 24, 1990).
36. Id.
37. See FED R. Civ. P. 25.1(b)(1) (Proposed Draft Feb. 24, 1990). This subsection provided:
(b) Time for Disclosure; A Continuing Duty.
(1) The parties shall make the disclosure required by subdivision (a) as fully as then
possible within twenty one days after the filing of an answer to the complaint. For cause,
the court may shorten or extend this time. If feasible, counsel shall meet to exchange
disclosures; otherwise, the disclosures shall be served as provided by Rule 5. All disclosures shall be promptly filed with the court.
Id.
The March 8, 1990 revision of the proposed rule redenominated this provision (2)(A) and deleted everything after the second sentence. The time specified was lengthened to 28 days after filing
an answer. See FED. R. Civ. P. 25.1 (Proposed Draft Mar. 8, 1990).
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be filed promptly with the court. Finally, the rule would have recommended

that the opposing lawyers meet to exchange their disclosures "[i f feasible";
otherwise they might exchange materials by ordinary service rules. 38 The duty
to disclose materials would have been a continuing duty and would have re-

quired parties to amend or supplement their earlier disclosures as new or different information was discovered or revealed. 39 These supplemental disclosures
would have had to have been served or fied within fourteen days after the dis-

closing party found out about the informationY° Except by leave of court, a
party would not have been able to make a mandatory disclosure twenty-one days

before trial.41
The Reporter's Note indicates that the twenty-one-day time period for disclosure was to permit "the earliest occasion on which an exchange of information can be made with fairness to both sides." 42 In general, regarding the timing

of the disclosure of information, the Reporter's Note stresses flexibility, feasibility, and fairness.4 3 The Committee also intended the proposed rule to minimalize the "sporting event" concept of discovery by requiring leave of court to make

a disclosure within twenty-one days of trial. With a particular view toward the
late designation of expert witnesses, 44 the Reporter's Note suggests that the purpose of the twenty-one-day requirement "is further to reduce the opportunity
and the incentive to surprise an adversary." 45
The third provision of the first draft of the proposed mandatory informal
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 25.1(b)(1) (Proposed Draft Feb. 24, 1990); see also FED. 1L Civ. P. 5
(governing service and filing of pleadings and other papers).
39. See FED. R. Civ. P. 25.1 (Proposed Draft Feb. 24, 1990). Subsection (b)(2) states:
The duty prescribed in subdivision (a) shall be a continuing duty, and each party shall
make additional or amended disclosures as required by subdivision (a) whenever new or
different information is discovered or revealed. Such additional or amended disclosures
shall be served and filed within fourteen days after the information is revealed to or discovered by the disclosing party, but in no event later than twenty one days before trial except
by leave of court.

Id.
This provision was redenominated (2)(B) and the 21-day provision was lengthened to 28 days.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 25.1 (Proposed Draft Mar. 8, 1990).
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 25.1(b)(2) (Proposed Draft Feb. 24, 1990).
41. Id.
42. See FED R. Civ. P. 25.1 advisory committee note (Proposed Dr-ift Feb. 24, 1990).
43. Id. With reference to the time requirements, the Advisory Committee Note states:
The time is selected as the earliest occasion on which an exchange of information can be
made with fairness to both sides. If the matter is one requiring expedited disposition, the
court may shorten the time. If there are other parties belatedly served who would gain an
unfair advantage or who might be unfairly disadvantaged by premature disclosures, the
court may extend the time.

Id.
44. Id. Discussing the bar against disclosure within 21 days of trial, the Advisory Committee
Note states:
A problem is most likely to arise with respect to an adverse witness who is not selected and
employed until the last possible moment in order to avoid an expense not necessary to be
incurred in the event of settlement. The rule effectively requires parties to designate experts far enough in advance that the opposing parties have a reasonable opportunity to
prepare a rebuttal.
Id.
45. Id.
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discovery rule stated that formal discovery through interrogatories or depositions would not be necessary to obtain any material or information that must
now be required to be disclosed under the new rule.46 The only exception is that
a party would have been entitled to depose, before trial, any witness identified by
the disclosing party.4 7 The effect of this third provision would have been to
preclude duplicative discovery, 48 and the Reporter's Note indicates that
"[b]ecause the purpose of this rule is to eliminate needless discovery, the court
should protect parties from redundant discovery." '49 Therefore, the proposed

rule would have imposed costs on an attorney who thwarted the informal disclo50
sure provisions and sought redundant discovery.
The fourth provision of the proposed informal discovery rule provided for
enforcement. 5 1 The chief sanction for a lawyer's failure to disclose properly
under the rule would have been the court's exclusion at trial of any evidence
sought to be offered by a party thai the party had not timely disclosed. 52 In
addition to being barred from using undisclosed evidence at trial, a party would
have been prohibited from proving facts or examining witnesses that had been
undisclosed to the party's opponents. 53 Finally, this enforcement provision
would have allowed for "any other sanction the court may employ."'54 Again, in
discussing these enforcement mechanisms, the Reporter's Note implicitly repudiates the poker-hand concept of litigation. "A party seeking to hide information in order to surprise an opponent at trial," the Reporter states, "is exposed to
46. See FED. R. Civ. P. 25.1(c) (Proposed Draft Feb. 24, 1990). This provision stated:
No Discovery of Information Required to be Disclosed. No discovery of matters required
to be disclosed shall be necessary to secure the information and a party shall be protected
against such discovery as provided in subdivisions (c) and (g) of Rule 26 except that an
opposing party shall be entitled pursuant to Rule 30 to depose prior to trial any witness
identified by the disclosing party.

Id.
This provision was retained in the March 8, 1990 revision of the rule, but redenominated as
subsection (d). See FED. R. Civ. P. 25.1 (Proposed Draft Mar. 8, 1990).
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 25.1(c) (Proposed Draft Feb. 24, 1990).
48. See id. advisory committee note.
49. Id.
50. Id.; see also FED. R. Crv. P. 26(g) (governing the signing of discovery requests, responses,
and objections).
51. See FD. R. Civ. P. 25.1(d) (Proposed Draft Feb. 24, 1990). This subsection provided:
Exclusion of Undisclosed Evidence. In addition to any other sanction the court may
employ, the court shall exclude at trial any evidence offered by a party that was not timely
disclosed as required by this rule, and no party shall be permitted to examine that party's
witness to prove facts other than those identified in the written disclosure to the party's
opponents except by leave of court granted upon a showing of cause.

Id.
The Committee retained this provision substantially in the March 8, 1990, version of the rule,
although redenominated as subsection (e). The clause "except by leave of court granted upon a

showing of cause" was moved further in the text, after additional language relating to expert witnesses was added:
[N]or shall any expert witness be allowed to testify to an opinion or a basis for an opinion
that was not timely disclosed, except by leave of court granted upon a showing of cause.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 25.1 (Proposed Draft Mar. 8, 1990).
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 25.1(d) (Proposed Draft Feb. 24, 1990).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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the likely consequence that the trap set will be prevented from working by action
55
of the court."
The fifth and final provision of the proposed informal discovery rule also
was a sanctioning provision, providing a disincentive for lawyers who deliberately would make a misleading disclosure under the rule. 56 If a misleading disclosure caused an opposing attorney to engage in "substantial unnecessary
investigation or discovery," ' 57 the court then might order the lawyer who ini-

tially supplied the misleading information to reimburse opposing counsel for the
costs of the unnecessary discovery. In addition, the lawyer who engaged in misleading discovery "may be subject to other appropriate sanctions as the court
may direct."5 8s The Reporter's Note again repudiates gamesmanship in civil discovery. Thus, this sanctioning provision would "impose[] restramt on parties
tempted to over-disclose or 'shove' the opposing parties with an excess of information, as by listing many persons as possible witnesses whom the disclosing
'59
party knows or should know to have no useful information."
This, then, was the first draft of the proposed informal discovery rule that
the Advisory Committee's Reporter characterized as "a fairly radical new
rule."' 6 The next section describes the genesis of this proposed new rule and the
experiences with similar local rules used in the federal courts.
55. Id. advisory committee note.
56. See FED. R. Civ. P. 25.1(e) (Proposed Draft Feb. 24, 1990). The proposed rule set forth
the following sanctions:
(e) Misleading Disclosure A party who makes a disclosure pursuant to this rule that
the party knew or should have known was inaccurate and thereby misleads an opposing
party to engage in substantial unnecessary investigation or discovery shall b5 ordered by
the court to reinburse [sic] the opposing party for the cost including attorneys' fees of such
unnecessary investigation or discovery and may be subject to other appropriate sanctions
as the court may direct.
Id.
The Reporter's Draft retained this provision, renaming it subsection (f). See FED. R. Civ. P.
25.1(f) (Proposed Draft March 8, 1990).
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 25.1(e) (Proposed Draft Feb. 24, 1990).
58. Id.
59. Id. advisory committee note (Proposed Draft Feb. 24, 1990). The Reporter's March 8,
1990 Draft moved pieces of the earlier rule around, and added a new subsection (b) entitled "Pretrial
Disclosure." This new section states:
(b) Pretrial Disclosure.
(1) In addition to the prompt disclosure, each party shall before trial disclose to
every other party the following information descriptive of the evidence that the disclosing
party will present in support of that party's claim or defense:
(A) the names, addresses, and phone numbers of all witnesses with a summary of
the material facts to which each witness is expected to testify;
(B) the substance of any expert opinion with a summary of the basis for any such
opinion and of the qualifications of any witness expected to present it, including a list of all
prior expert appearances by that witness that have occurred within the preceding three
years; and
(C) the identity and location of any exhibits.
(2) Pretrial disclosure shall be made not later than 28 days before trial, unless the
court designates another time.
FED. R. Civ. P. 25.1(b) (Proposed Draft Mar. 8, 1990).
60. Cover memorandum from Professor Paul Carrington, Office of the Reporter, Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States (February 22, 1990).
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B. The Origins and Gdnesis of a Mandatory Informal Discovery Rule
The impetus for drafting an informal discovery rule came from the Chair of
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and two other members of the Advisory
Committee, including Professor Wayne Brazil, a practicing attorney and now a
federal magistrate. 61 The Committee Chair's stated desire was to encourage at-

torneys to "utilize informal methods of discovery before resorting to the expen' '62
sive formal methods such as depositions and interrogatories.

Professor Brazil had suggested such a mandatory informal discovery rule in
a 1978 law review article.63 Highly critical of the adversarial character of modem civil discovery, Professor Brazil proposed "imposing duties on both counsel
and client to disclose voluntarily, and at all stages of trial preparation, all potentially relevant evidence and information."" Because the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure contain no mention of such mandatory informal discovery, the Advisory Committee in the autumn of 1989 began
developing a proposed rule to
65
formalize this informal discovery process.

1. The Theory of Informal Discovery
In general, "informal discovery" describes a process of information access
and exchange that occurs in litigation before the parties resort to the more for-

malized discovery provided in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 through 37.
The federal discovery rules do not mention the possibility of informal discovery,
but presume that attorneys in their trial preparation will resort to the standard,
formal devices for information exchange: interrogatories, depositions, requests
for production of documents, admissions, and physical and mental
examinations.
61. The three members behind the proposed informal discovery rule were Chairman Judge
John F. Grady (United States District Court, N.D. I11.), Mr. James Powers, Esq., and the Hon.
Wayne D. Brazil (United States Magistrate, N.D. Cal.). Preliminary discussions concerning this
rule took place during the summer of 1989. In August 1989 Judge Grady requested that the Federal
Judicial Center conduct preliminary research into local informal discovery rules. See Letters from
Judge John F. Grady to Mr. Tom Willging (Federal Judicial Center) and Magistrate Wayne D.
Brazil (September 1, 1989) (discussing a proposed informal discovery rule).
62. Letter from Judge John F. Grady to the Hon. Wayne D. Brazil (September 1, 1989).
63. See Brazil, supra note 6, at 1349.
64. Id. Professor Brazil's proposals were tied to a heightened sense of lawyer professionalism
during pretrial preparation, now also stressed by the Advisory Committee. He described this professionalism as follows:
In particular, new rules of professional responsibility and civil procedure should be

fashioned for the investigative and discovery stages. During these stages, counsel should be
directed to view themselves primarily as officers of the court rather than partisan advocates. As officers of the court, counsel should be commanded by new ethical directives and
civil rules to search diligently for all data that might help resolve disputes fairly and to
share voluntarily the results of their searches with both the court and the other parties to
the action .... Under the changes proposed here, counsel's primary loyalties during the
trial and post-trial stages would remain where they are today: to their clients.
Id. at 1349-50.
65. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. The author conducted preliminary research
into local rules practice for the Advisory Committee during fall 1989. The results of this research
and telephone interviews with practicing attorneys were presented to the Advisory Committee at its
November 1989 meeting. See Memorandum to the Members of the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules Regarding Proposed Rule 25.1 (Informal Discovery Procedure) (November 16, 1989).
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In its broadest understanding, informal discovery contemplates several actions by attorneys. For example, it might include an attorney preparing a case

by independently investigating a client's assertions, collecting documents from

the client, and interviewing witnesses known through the client. 66 HInformal dis-

covery also occurs when attorneys on both sides of a litigation exchange the
fruits of these investigations: documents, witness lists, tangible evidence, and

any other material relevant to the case.

Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure currently do not contemplate anything other than formal discovery, amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(a)(3) indicates that the purpose of the pretrial conference is to

discourage wasteful pretrial activities. 67 In addition, Federal Rule of Civil Proeedure 16(c) indicates that the participants at pretrial conferences may take action to obtain (1) admissions of fact and documents that will avoid unnecessary

proof, (2) stipulations regarding the authenticity of documents, and (3) the identification of witnesses and documents. 68 Taken together, these provisions suggest the possibility of early case management that would include encouraging
the informal exchange of information about the litigation. Overarching all these
technical provisions is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, which simply states
that the federal rules "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpen' 69
sive determination of every action."
Contemporary discovery practice perpetually has been criticized, attacked,

and generally lamented, 70 a trend that continues unabated. 7 1 The prevalent critique of civil discovery under the federal rules is that it is inefficient, wasteful,

costly, and subject to precisely the kind of gamesmanship that the drafters of the
rules sought to eliminate. 72 Thus, rather than reducing the poker-hand concept
66.
67.
68.
69.

See Moot, ConsiderDoing No Discovery, 15 LITIGATION 36, 39-40 (1988).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(3).
FED. IL Civ. P. 16(c)(3), (5).

FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
70. See, eg., W. BRAzIL, CIVIL DISCOVERY: LAWYERS' VIEWS OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS, PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS AND ABUSES (1980); P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL
CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY 1-3 (1978); J. EBERSOLE & B.
BURKE, DISCOVERY PROBLEMS IN CIVIL CASES 10-39 (1980); ELLINGTON, A STUDY OF SANCTIONS FOR DISCOVERY ABUSE (Dep't of Justice 1979); D. SEGAL, SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON
DISCOVERY FROM 1970 TO THE PRESENT: EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTIONS AND PROPOSED REFORMS 9-69 (1978); J. SHAPARD & C. SERON, ATTORNEYS' VIEWS OF LOCAL RULES LIMITING

INTERROGATORIES (1986); Cohn, FederalDiscovery: A Survey of Local Rules and Practicesin View
of ProposedChanges to the FederalRules, 63 MINN. L. REV. 253, 255 (1979); Schroeder & Frank,
The ProposedChanges in the Discovery Rules, 1978 AIZ. ST. L.J. 475, 475-78.
71.

See, eg., REPORT OF A TASK FORCE, JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSrS AND DELAY IN

CIVIL LITIGATION (The Brookings Institution 1989) (especially Recommendations 4-6 dealing with
discovery reform); FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS

STUDY COMMITTEE 99-100, 102-03 (April 2, 1990) (discussing case management, including discovery and protective orders in discovery) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY

COMMITTEE]; see also Hazard, Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the FederalRules of
Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2237-44 (1989) (discussing problems and attempts at
discovery reform during fifty years of federal rules procedure); Mandelbaum, Discovery Abuse: Some
New PossibilitiesForRescuing Sisyphus, 12 INSIDE LITIGATION 1 (December 1989) (describing the
Advisory Committee's efforts in drafting a new proposed informal discovery rule, among other discovery reform efforts).

72. See generally Brazil, supra note 6 (arguing that the adversarial nature of discovery creates
functional and economic burdens on dispute resolution, which discovery reforms cannot remove).
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of the adversarial process, the discovery provisions enable skillful practitioners,
particularly in complex cases, to use extended discovery as a means of delay,
harassment, or exhaustion of an opponent's resources. Another theory is that
actual or threatened protracted discovery influences settlement to the disadvantage of one side of the lawsuit. 73 These perceptions of formal discovery have

prompted a few judges, magistrates, academicians, and law reformers to propose

that attorneys use informal discovery procedures more extensively to acquire
fact information needed for trial. 74 These proponents further urge that "informal discovery" procedures be required as a matter of course before the attorneys
undertake any formal discovery.
Still, there is virtually no empirical study of the current practice of such
informal discovery, the efficacy of such experiences, or the results of informal
discovery. 75 There also is no literature describing the types of cases in which
lawyers elect to use informal discovery, whether the attorney discusses this
choice with the client, or the extent to which opposing counsel cooperates.
There are no analyses of the use of these methods and the relative ease in obtaining information needed for adequate trial preparation. There has been
neither empirical research assessing the efficiency and cost savings achieved

through informal discovery methods, nor any assessment of attorney and client
satisfaction with informal discovery.
Discovery also is a procedural occurrence unlikely to result in reported case
law. Because most formal discovery occurs outside the purview of judges, with
rare intervention by the court,76 informal discovery is even less likely to result in
73. Id. at 1315-20.

74. See, eg., id. at 1349-50 (suggesting imposing a duty on counsel to use informal discovery
methods first); Sobel, Abbreviating Complex Civil Cases, in CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES LEGAL
PROGRAM, ADR AND THE COURTS: A MANUAL FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS 195 (S. Fine ed.

1987) (advising that an early pretrial conference should address a plan for "truncated or minimum
discovery"); Moot, supra note 66 (describing successful instances of minimal or no discovery in
actual litigation); Peckham, A JudicialResponse to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, TwoStage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTroERS L. REV. 253, 267-69
(1985) (discussing two-stage discovery planning with first stage of minimal discovery); Pieras, Judicial Economy and Efficiency Through the Initial Scheduling Conference: The Method, 35 CATH.
U.L. REV. 943, 945-46 (1986) (district court judge directs parties to learn facts from clients, independent investigation, and informal discovery); W. SCHWARZER & L. PASHOW, CIVIL DIscov-

ERY: A GUIDE TO EFFICIENT PRACTICE 8 (1988) (suggesting that formal discovery "is not
necessarily the only or best means" to obtain information for possible use in litigation); see also T.
MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL TECHNIQUES 17-49 (1988) (extensive discussion of possible

informal fact investigation and discovery techniques, noting "formal discovery is the most expensive
way to get information"); J. McELHANEY, TRIAL NOTEBOOK 13-22 (2d ed. 1987) (describing techniques of informal discovery).
75. But see Moot, supra note 66 (describing successful use of minimal or no discovery in several
recent cases, including some complex cases). Many standard textbook discussions of discovery and
pretrial practice also omit any suggestion of the possibility of informal discovery. See, e.g., J.
FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 7.1-7.3 (1985) (discussing possibility of and limitations on discovery prior to the commencement of a lawsuit); R. HAYDOCK & D.
HERR, DISCOVERY: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND PROBLEMS 12-307 (1983) (outlining methods of discovery under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26-37); D. LOUISELL, G. HAZARD & C. TAIT,
PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 901-11 (6th ed. 1989) (discussing mechanics of discovery without men-

tioning informal discovery techniques).
76. Courts typically become involved in discovery to determine the applicability of privileges
and immunities, to determine the issuance of protective orders, or to impose sanctions for failure to
cooperate in discovery. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (scope of discovery and privileges); FED. R.
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judicial intervention and subsequent written opinion. 77 Simply put, if lawyers
now using informal discovery methods encounter problems, they simply resort
to the formal discovery rules to secure needed information. 78 Thus, there is no
body of case law from which to draw any generalizations about the practice or
efficacy of informal discovery methods.
Informal discovery goes on all the time in practice. Some lawyers call it'
investigation; 79 others view it as cooperative lawyering; others call it "show and
tell." 80 The question for the Advisory Committee is whether this practice is
sufficiently valuable to suggest a mandatory rule of universal applicability.
2. The Practice of Informal Discovery: Show and Tell
As indicated above, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not contain
any explicit requirement that lawyers in civil cases resort to informal discovery
prior to embarking on formal discovery under the rules. At best, under the
current rules, the pretrial conference might provide a setting for the judicial
encouragement of informal discovery options.8 1 In contrast, informal discovery
normally is used in criminal procedure,8 2 and some jurisdictions have adopted a
local rule for informal discovery in criminal cases. 83 Although proposed rule
25.1 purported to institute a "radical new rule" for civil discovery, informal
discovery has been going on for some time in complex civil litigation, 84 as well
as pursuant to various local rules.85 Informal discovery also apparently is the
Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (trial preparation materials protected by work product doctrine); FED. R. Civ. P.
26(c) (protective orders); FED. P. Civ. P. 26(g) (sanctions); FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (sanctions for failure
to make or cooperate in discovery).
77. There is no reported case law on informal discovery. Practicing attorneys in Florida reported knowledge of judge-imposed sanctions for noncompliance with the local mandatory informal
discovery rules, but these sanctions have not resulted in reported decisional law. See infra text
accompanying notes 134-35.
78. See infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., T. MAUIET, supra note 74, at 17-49.
80. Telephone interview with Barry Davidson, Esq. (Nov. 3, 1989).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
82. See generally Symposium on CriminalDiscovery, 68 WASH. U.L.Q. 19 (1990) (evaluating
the increase in criminal discovery made available over the past 25 years).
83. See, eg., D.D.C. Cr. R. 304 ('Defense counsel shall consult with the attorney for the
United States prior to the first status conference in a criminal case and shall attempt to obtain
voluntary discovery of all materials and information to which the defense may be entitled"); D.
MASS. R. 42 (automatic discovery in criminal cases); W.D. WASH. CRIM. R. 48 (various provisions
for expediting discovery from the government and defense in criminal cases).
84. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.422 (2d ed. 1985) ('Other Practices to Save
Time and Expense").
85. See C.D. CALIF. R. 6 ("Early Meeting of Counsel-Report to Court-Status Conference").
This rule requires attorneys to exchange all documents then "reasonably available to a party which
are then contemplated to be used in support of the allegations of the pleading filed by the party;" to
exchange "any other evidence reasonably available to a party to obviate the filing of unnecessary
discovery motions;" and to exchange "a list of witnesses then known to have knowledge of the facts
supporting the material allegations of the pleading filed by the party." Id.; see also S.D. FLA. Cr. R.
14(A) (entitled "Pretrial Procedure in Civil Actions," rule contains same requirements as the California local rule); D. GUAM R. 235-5(a) (subsection (a) of rule entitled "Meeting of Counsel and
Preparation of Proposed Scheduling Order" contains same requirements as the California and Florida rules); cf. E.D. PA. Cr. R. 26 (requiring exchange of medical reports in civil cases at least ten
days before pretrial conference).
Judge Jaime Pieras, Jr. of the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico
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norm in many administrative proceedings because the Administrative Procedure
Act does not provide for formal discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 6 The differences in criminal and administrative proceedings, however,
make those proceedings irrelevant to the use of informal discovery in the civil
87
litigation context.

(a) Informal Discovery in Complex Litigation
Informal discovery is recommended for preliminary discovery in complex
cases. 88 The Manualfor Complex Litigation specifically recommends informal
discovery as an expense- and time-saving practice and suggests that judges man-

age complex litigation through mandated, scheduled discovery occurring in sequences or waves.8 9 The Manual recommends that:
Counsel provide information to opposing counsel without resort to formal discovery procedures. In particular, documentary evidence is frequently made available voluntarily by experienced counsel who know

the types of documents that will likely be requested and must be disclosed. Informal interviews with possible witnesses may also be arranged; this procedure may be very efficient in obtaining background
information, in conducting "first wave" discovery, and in verifying, au-

thenticating, or explaining documents. 90

Thus, "first wave" discovery would be informal discovery, or discovery
made pursuant to a local rule or standing order requiring disclosure of evidence
supporting a party's allegations without the need for a formal discovery reexercises his authority under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 to use an Initial Scheduling Conference as the forum for initiating informal discovery methods. A description of his requirement of
informal discovery may be found in Pieras, supra note 74, at 945-54.
In addition, the Committee on Discovery for the New York State Bar Association Section on
Commercial and Federal Litigation has proposed a new local informal discovery rule patterned on
the Florida and California rules. See COMMITTEE ON DISCOVERY, NEW YORK STATE BAR AssOCIATION SECTION ON COMMERCIAL AND FEDERAL LITIGATION, REPORT ON DISCOVERY UNDER

RULE 26(B)(1) 17-20 (July 1989) ("Proposed Local Rule").
86. See, eg., K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 14.8 (2d ed. 1978) (APA contains
no provision for discovery and provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for discovery do
not apply to administrative proceedings; parties rely on prehearing conferences); B. SCHWARTZ,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 287-88 (2d ed. 1982) (no right to discovery exists in administrative hearings,
either under due process or the APA); J. STEIN, G. MITCHELL & B. MEZINES, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW § 23.02[l] (1989) ("As reflected by the APA and agency statutes and rules, no non-agency
party under investigation or otherwise associated with an investigation has rights of discovery.").
87. Another possible use of informal discovery is in relation to alternative dispute resolution
techniques. See Sobel, supra note 74, at 195-96.
88. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.422 (2d ed. 1985).
89. Id. §§ 21.421, 21.422.
90. Id. § 21.422. The Manual notes that counsel may subsequently file requests for admissions
to assure that the results of informal discovery are usable at trial. In addition to recommending
informal discovery as a means of saving time and expense in the preparation of complex cases, the
Manual also suggests other creative discovery practices, such as stipulations under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 29 (including modifications of the formal discovery rules); automatic disclosure of
witnesses and documents that counsel expect to use in establishing the claims upon which they have
the burden of proof, methods of reducing deposition costs; discovery from other litigation and coordination of common discovery in related litigation; joint discovery requests and responses; modified
discovery responses; combined discovery requests; and conference depositions. Id.
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quest. 9 1 After the parties complete this informal discovery, the parties may conduct additional "waves" of discovery on the merits.9"
Althoilgh the Manualfor Complex Litigation recommends use of informal
discovery techniques and discovery sequencing, little is known about the actual
discovery practice under these procedures. 93 The Manual'sprovisions generally
are not mandatory, 94 but are more aspirational recommendations. The informal
discovery provisions in the Manualfor Complex Litigation have no enforcement

or sanctioning provisions, so any informal discovery methods that are used in
complex cases must be accomplished through a managerial judge and cooperative counsel. 95 Informal discovery techniques recommended in the Manualfor

96
Complex Litigation most likely are invoked in multidistrict litigation cases,
which comprise only a relatively small portion of the federal court caseload at

any given time. 97 Thus, the experience of informal discovery in complex cases is

difficult to assess in relation to a proposed rule of universal applicability across
all types of civil cases.
(b)

Informal Discovery Under Existing Local Rules

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, each district court may adopt
local rules of practice that are not inconsistent with the general federal rules. 98
With regard to discovery matters, many district courts have adopted numerous

rules and provisions governing discovery in the district. 99 The most prevalent

91. Id. § 21.421. This specifically excludes formal discovery requests through interrogatories,
depositions, and document production under the formal rules.
92. Id. Stressing the efficiencies of early informal discovery, the Manual notes: "Although the
details and formalities vary, this approach to discovery is valuable in preventing early, ineffectual
discovery and in avoiding postponements that otherwise may result from belated discovery of witnesses and documents in the final pretrial processes." Id.
For a discussion of the concept of "wave discovery" by the Chief Judge of the United States
District Court of the Northern District of California, see Peckham, supra note 74, at 267-76.
93. See R. MARCUS & E. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LrIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 506 (1985).
94. See Simons, The Manualfor Complex Litigation: More Rules or Mere Recommendations,
62 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 493, 497-98 (1988).
95. Id. "The creators of the Manual remind us that 'it is not binding law. It has no binding
effect. It is only as good as the credibility of the authors and the utility of the materials.' The
Manual asserts that its recommendations, like the Federal Rules, are examples of the court's inherent authority to manage litigation." Id. (quoting MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LMGATION § 20.1, at 6
(2d ed. 1985)).
96. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988) (covering multidistrict litigation).
97. See 1989 DIRECrOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS
ANNUAL REPORT 23.

98. See FED. R. Civ. P. 83 ("Rules by District Courts").
99. See generally REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT: LOCAL RULES ON CIVIL PRACTICE (April 1989) (surveying the policies behind and the practice under local civil practice rules).
Authorized by the United States Judicial Conference on the Recommendation of the Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure (Agenda 6-7, September 1984), this project was "intended to address at least several needs: to provide a complete legal review of local rules for potential legal errors
or internal inconsistencies; to study how rulemaking and the actual rules work in practice; and to
provide a systematic review of the underlying policies of local rules." Memorandum from Judge
Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to the Chief Judges
of the District Courts (April 1989) (discussing local rules on civil practice). The Reporter for the
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type of local discovery rule limits the number of interrogatories, 100 or provides
for standard or "form" interrogatories for use in certain types of cases. 10 1 In
addition to local rules about discovery, other modifications of discovery practice
are accomplished locally through judges' standing orders, 10 2 which may be issued for particular cases 0 3 or for groups of related cases. 104
Three district courts, Guam, the Southern District of Florida, and the Central District of California, have adopted local rules specifically designed to require informal discovery before resort to formal discovery. These local rules use

the same language and provisions to require attorneys to exchange documents,
other evidence, and lists of witnesses the parties expect to use at trial in support

of allegations in the pleadings. 10 5 In addition, all three local rules impose a
Local Rules Project was Dean and Professor Daniel R. Coquillette; Ms. Mary P. Quires served as
the project director; and Professor Stephen N. Subrin served as a project consultant.
For recent commentary on local rules, see Frank, LocalRules, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2059 (1989);
Napolitano, A Comment on FederalRules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence,
and Emerging ProceduralPatterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2063 (1989); Subrin, FederalRules, Local
Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging ProceduralPatterns, 137 U. PA. L.
REv. 1999 (1989).
100. See, eg., M.D. FLA. Cr. R. 3.03(a) (limiting written interrogatories to fifty); S.D. ILL. Cr.
R. 15(a) (limiting interrogatories to twenty, including subparts); D. MASS. CT. R. 16(a)(1) (limiting
interrogatories to thirty, unless leave to file a larger number is granted by the court); D. NEV. CT. R.
190-1(c) (limiting interrogatories to forty, including subparts); M.D. TENN. CT. R. 9(a)(2) (limiting
interrogatories to thirty, including subparts, with leave of court for additional interrogatories).
101. See, eg., S.D. GA. Cr. R. 8.6 (listing eight specific interrogatories to be answered by all
parties to the litigation); S.D.N.Y. Cr. R. 46(a) (listing restrictions on interrogatories). According

to the New York rule:
At the commencement of discovery, interrogatories will be restricted to those seeking
names of witnesses with knowledge or information relevant to the subject matter of the
action, the computation of each category of damage alleged, and the existence, custodian,
location and general description of relevant documents, including pertinent insurance
agreements, and other physical evidence, or information of a similar nature.
Id.; see also D.S.C. Cr. R. 7.05-7.06 (listing standard interrogatories to be answered by all parties to
a litigation). The language of the New York local rule has been substantially adopted for the proposed federal rule 25.1. See supra notes 31-60 and accompanying text.
102. See, eg., Discovery Plan and Schedule for Depositions and Medical Examinations of Plaintiffs, Cimino v. Raymark (E.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 1989) (Civil Action No. B-86-456-CA) (Hines, Mag.)
(limiting depositions to 45 minutes each), aff'd by Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Magistrate's
Report (E.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 1990) (Parker, Dist. Ct. J.).
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Standing Order for Asbestos Cases in the Eastern District of Texas (July 15, 1982)
(including special standing orders regulating discovery); W.D. WASH. CRIM. R. 48, cited in In re
Amendments to Local Criminal Rules, a General Order (August 11, 1989) (governing discovery in
criminal cases).
105. See C.D. CAL. R. 6.1.1 to .1.4, 6.2; S.D. FLA. R. 14; D. GUAM. R. 235-5. With a different
preamble to each local rule, the following provisions are worded almost identically in the three local
rules:
1. Documents-To exchange all documents then reasonably available to a party
which are then contemplated to be used in support of the allegations of the pleading filed
by the party. Documents later shown to have been reasonably available to a party and not
exchanged may be subject to exclusion at time of trial.
2. Discovery Schedule-To agree upon a preliminary schedule for all discovery in
the matter.
3. Other evidence-To exchange any other evidence then reasonably available to
obviate the filing of unnecessary discovery motions.
4. List of Witnesses-To exchange a list of witnesses then known to have knowledge
of the facts supporting the material allegations of the pleading filed by the party. The
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continuing obligation on counsel to advise the opposing counsel of other witnesses as they become known. These local rules mandating or "formalizing"
informal discovery techniques are implemented through the general local rules
10 6
on early pretrial conferences.
In Florida, several attorneys suggested that if lawyers did not cooperate in
informal discovery, their cases would be delayed because judges, busy with other
pressing demands, would not make themselves available to referee discovery disputes.10 7 One practicing attorney reported that the local rule was revised in the
early 1980s in response to the increase in criminal drug cases on the local federal
docket,10 8 which decreased the time available for civil cases. The lawyers pracparties shall thereafter be under a continuing obligation to advise opposing parties of other
witnesses as they become known.
5. Settlement-To discuss, in good faith, settlement of the action.
6. Complicated Case-To discuss whether the action is sufficiently complicated so
that all or part of the procedures of the Manual on Complex Litigation should be used.
Counsel may propose to the Court modifications of the procedures in the Manual to facilitate the management of a particular action.
7. Report and Proposed Order-Within ten (10) days after the meeting held pursuant to this subsection, those attending are mutually obligated to file a joint Report of
Scheduling Meeting setting forth: (a) a detailed schedule of discovery for each party; (b)
discussion of the likelihood of settlement; (c) discussion of the likelihood of appearance in
the action of additional parties; (d) a preliminary estimate of the time required for trial;
and (e) any other information that might be helpful to the Court in setting the case for
status or pretrial conference.
S.D. FLA. R. 14.
The California local rule requires a report to the court within fourteen days of the early meeting, C.D. CAL. R. 6.2, and the Guam rule sets no deadline for the proposed scheduling order, D.
GUAM R. 235-5(b). The three rules differ beyond these basic provisions. The California rule makes
no mention of sanctions for failure to comply; the Florida rule is vague with regard to compliance,
see S.D. FLA. R. 14(a)(10); and the Guam rule suggests that the failure of a party to participate in
good faith in framing of the proposed scheduling order "may result in the imposition of appropriate
sanctions," see D. GUAM R. 235-5(b).
106. A number of particularized discovery provisions are part of local rules on pretrial conference and procedure. See, eg., E.D. CAL. R. 23.00 (recommending early discovery conferences under
federal rule 26(f)); S.D. GA. R. 8.6-.7 (regulating form interrogatories through local pretrial conference and order rule); C.D. ILL. R. 14 (preliminary pretrial conference should include discussion of

discovery matters); S.D. ILL. R. 14 (mandatory conference on discovery); S.D. IOWA R. 16 (requiring mandatory scheduling conference including discussion of discovery matters); D. MASS. R. 16(d)
(requiring conference of counsel to settle discovery objections); D. MoNT. R. 235(e) (requiring preliminary pretrial conference "to discuss any problems of discovery" and "indicate in a general way
the course of discovery"); D. NEv. R. 190-1 (governing discovery); N.D. OHIO R. 3.04 (encouraging
pretrial discovery conferences "to reduce, in every possible way, the filing of unnecessary discovery
procedures"); D.S.C. R. 7.02-7.06 (describing mandatory pretrial conference procedure under federal rule 16(b) and relationship to local discovery procedures); M.D. TENN. R. 9 (detailing procedures for discovery in civil cases, including provision for discovery conferences); D. UTAH R. 9
(providing for discovery conferences).
The abundance of local rules modifying discovery practice suggests a developed "common law"
of discovery practice in the districts, apart from the overarching federal rules on discovery. The
trend of these local rules is toward increased limitations and more frequent meeting of parties and
judicial officers to curb over-discovery or other abuse.
107. Telephone interviews with Barry Davidson, Esq. (November 3, 1989); Mike Nachwalter,
Esq. (November 13, 1989); and Bob Josefsberg, Esq. (November 14, 1989).
108. Telephone interview with Elizabeth du Fresne, Esq. (Nov. 13, 1989). Du Fresne suggested
that because the Southern District of Florida is congested with drug cases, lawyers in civil cases
cannot get hearings on discovery motions for approximately a year to a year-and-a-half. She said
there tends to be a tremendous backup on unargued motions and that "discovery motions are the
least favored on earth." Id. She reported that because local lawyers had to arrange discovery with-

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

ticed informal discovery, and a kind of common-law practice of informal discov-

ery developed in advance of formal promulgation of the local rule. Attorneys,
then, viewed the informal discovery rule as an institutionalization of practices
that already had developed among attorneys handling civil cases in federal

court. When the local rule requiring informal discovery finally was adopted,
local lawyers generally were familiar with the purpose and practice of the
o
rule.1 9

In Florida and California, federal judges indicated that they were instrumental in proposing and promulgating these local rules on informal discovery in

the early 1970s.110 They reported that their local rules on informal discovery
were working very well, and that the rules "spurred attorneys to do their investigative work" and "really moved things along."11' 1 In both districts, federal
judges reported that "all the judges use it" and are enthusiastic about it. 112 This
judicial assessment contrasted with comments from practicing lawyers, who suggested that only twenty-five to fifty percent of federal judges in the district used
the rule, while one attorney said that one-third of judges in the district did not
pay attention to it.1 13 There is, however, no empirical data concerning the use

so these reports from judges and pracof the local informal discovery provisions,
14
titioners are highly impressionistic.'
Of the small sample of lawyers questioned about the informal discovery rule
out judges and without rulings on discovery motions, they were quite receptive to a new rule on
discovery practice.
Du Fresne stated that the impetus for the Florida local rule came from Judge King in the early
1980s. He set up an ad hoc committee to provide the court with suggestions for revising rules for
discovery practice. The committee recommended changes in local rule 14, a pretrial conference rule.
Among the new recommendations were a 90-day discovery conference; the requirement of a report
to the court on that discovery conference; the certification of trying to work out a discovery plan or
schedule; and a requirement for a scheduling order. Before revision, Florida local rule 14 did not
have requirements regarding mandatory settlement discussions, exchange of documents and witness
lists, or the continuing obligation to divulge witnesses. Most of these recommendations were incorporated into new local rule 14.
109. Interviews with attorneys, supra notes 107-08.
110. One judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida stated
that when he and another judge came onto the bench, they started a movement to adopt a local rule

on informal discovery. He reported that they learned of informal discovery techniques from seminars at the Federal Judicial Center and that two other judges in his district were also "big on informal discovery." Interview with Clerk's Office, United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida (Nov. 2, 1989).
Two judges in the Central District of California reported that California local rule 6 on informal discovery became a formal rule in the early 1970s. Interview with judge, C.D. Calif. (Nov. 7,
1989). Judge Mariana R. Pfaelzer, also of the United States District Court for the Central District
of California and a member of the current Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, confirmed these
observations concerning practice under Local Rule 6. See Memorandum from Joe Cecil to Linda
Mullenix and Tom Willging, Federal Judicial Center (November 18, 1989) (regarding Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules).
11. Interviews with Clerk's Office and judge, supra note 110.
112. Interviews with Clerk's Office and judge, supra note 110.
113. Interview with Barry Davidson, supra note 107.
114. The author spoke with four attorneys identified as primarily federal court practitioners in
the Southern District of Florida. The author was unable in the short period of time in which this
survey was done to contact federal practitioners in the Central District of California. This telephone
sampling of local practitioners was decidedly unscientific and meant to provide preliminary information to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules at its November 1989 meeting. The author reported
these preliminary comments and suggested that further study be undertaken to explore the experi-
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in Florida, three endorsed the rule and one expressed skeptiqism." 5 The general
tenor from these practicing attorneys was that the local rule on informal discovery was a good one when it worked well, but whether the rule worked well
depended on the quality and experience of the lawyers involved in the litiga-

tion. 116 The attorneys stated that "better" or "more sophisticated" lawyers

complied with the rule; however, obstreperous opposing counsel could frustrate
the spirit of the rule with technical compliance. 1 7 One attorney noted that
8
some lawyers who still prefer "trial by ambush" do not comply with the rule.'"
There was no consensus concerning which lawyers were more likely to comply
with the local rule and why. The lawyers suggested that the local rule works
when the lawyers want to cooperate, but often there is pro forma compliance
with the rule's reporting duty."19
It is difficult to assess the extent of judicial involvement with the local informal discovery rule. The responses of Florida practitioners ranged from "most
judges use it and are rigorous in enforcing it" to "there is not a lot of interaction
with the judge," and "the judge will become involved only if one side is not
complying" and the other side files a motion. 120 The lawyers varied in their
assessments of how many judges were seriously interested in the rule, and one
attorney said that some judges actively encouraged compliance with the rule
because it helped keep discovery motions off their calendars. 12
There are no monitoring systems of attorneys' actions under the local rules.
Judges typically become involved in informal discovery only if an attorney's failure to comply is called to the judge's attention through another lawyer's motion
to compel compliance.' 2 2 The practitioners said they knew of instances in
which this occurred and said the judge usually used a hearing on the motion to
ence with these two local rules. The Committee declined the suggestion for further study of practice
under the local rules.
115. The attorney expressing greatest skepticism about the local rule was Mike Nachwalter.
Interview with Mike Nachwalter, supra note 107. He stated that the efficacy of the rule depended
primarily on the opposing lawyer. Id. If the other lawyer wants to cooperate, then the rule works.
He stated that the rule is a good rule in theory, but does not work in practice because judges do not
get involved early enough, if at all. Id. He said that the local rule 14 report is largely pro forma and
perfunctory and that lawyers usually have not exchanged much, but must file under the rule anyway.
Id.
116. Interviews with attorneys, supra notes 107-08.
117. Id. Mr. Davidson commented that state practitioners who appear infrequently in federal
court think the rule is burdensome. Ms. du Fresne suggested that although most attorneys comply
with the rule, they do not comply when they are dealing with an unsophisticated or truly overworked lawyer. Mr. Josefsberg commented that there is compliance by lawyers "who know what
they are doing," and that younger lawyers seem to follow the rule better than older ones.
118. Interview with Bob Josefsberg, supra note 107.
119. Interview with Mike Nachwalter, supra note 107.
120. Interviews with attorneys, supra note 107.
121. Interview with Elizabeth du Fresne, supra note 108. Du Fresne gave some examples of
judicial interaction with rule 14 requirements. Id. She said that one federal judge would express
strong disappointment at the status conference if the attorneys were not complying with rule 14. Id.
She indicated that two other federal judges appeared before local bar groups to educate attorneys

about the rule and to encourage lawyers to use it. Id. She also said that judges ensure compliance by

being available, but there is no formal compliance system. She said she thought the rule could be
improved with a formal monitoring system. Id.
122. Interview with attorneys, supra note 107.
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order compliance. The attorneys indicated they believed that the full range of a
judge's sanctioning powers was available to enforce compliance, 123 but only one
attorney knew of a monetary sanction for failure to comply with the local
rule. 124 Another attorney suggested that the judge could strike pleadings for
failure to comply.125
The practitioners queried about practice under the local rule estimated that
eighty to ninety percent of federal litigators in the district complied with the
letter of the rule, 126 but the respondents would not speculate about the noncomplying ten to twenty percent, other than to characterize these attorneys as
unsophisticated, recalcitrant, or wanting to conduct trial by ambush.
The Florida practicing attorneys disagreed on what materials and information parties actually divulge under the informal discovery provisions. The Florida local rule requires lawyers to meet ninety days after filing a complaint to
exchange documents and witness lists. 127 The lawyers indicated that documents
and witness lists do get exchanged, but a dissenting attorney said that in reality
little gets disclosed because a lawyer typically does not have enough information

ninety days after filing to make a meaningful exchange. 128 He suggested further
that an attorney is more likely to disclose only witnesses and information al129
ready known to the other side.

There was further disagreement about the extent to which formal discovery
occurs after compliance with local requirements on informal discovery. Some
lawyers said that if there is meaningful compliance with the local rule, very little
formal discovery remains to be done; other lawyers suggested that the local rule
123. Interviews with Bob Josefsberg, supra note 107; Elizabeth du Fresne, supra note 108.
124. Interview with Elizabeth du Fresne, supra note 108. She said that she knew of one instance
of a $1000 sanction imposed by a federal judge for an attorney's non-compliance with the 90-day
rule for pretrial procedures. Id.
125. Interview with Bob Josefsberg, supra note 107.
126. Interviews with attorneys, supra notes 107-08. Ms. du Fresne suggested that most attorneys do comply with the local rule, but that all compliance is voluntary and that she had experienced
a few instances of noncompliance. Interview with Elizabeth du Fresne, supra note 108. She said
that some lawyers will give up very few documents and divulge only a few witnesses. Id. When this
happened to her, she wrote a unilateral report to the court indicating that opposing counsel was
"stonewalling." Id. She said that opposing counsel had complied with the letter but not the spirit of
the rule. Id. The judge held a status conference and told opposing counsel he expected the lawyers
to be more forthcoming with information. Opposing counsel then complied.
127. The Florida rule provides:
Within twenty (20) days after the filing of an answer by the last answering defendant, or
within ninety (90) days after the filing of a complaint (whichever shall first occur) in all
civil actions, except those specifically excluded by subpart 9 of this subsection, counsel for
the parties (or the party if proceedingpro se) shall meet in person, by telephone, or by other
comparable means ....
S.D. FLA. R. 14(A)(1), (4); see supra note 105 (quoting the additional provisions that require the
exchange of documents and witness lists).
128. Interview with Mike Nachwalter, supra note 107. Nachwalter commented that under the
rule lawyers are supposed to give documents and witness lists to the other side, but that the time
frame is too short and the lawyers typically do not know enough about the case ninety days after
filing to make this a meaningful exchange. Id.
129. Id. Nachwalter said that usually little gets exchanged because lawyers do not have much
information after ninety days, and that lawyers will divulge known witnesses, but may not divulge
undiscovered witnesses. He further suggested that a lawyer will give up only what is known by the
other side. Id.
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does not necessarily reduce formal discovery, but merely "focuses" it more precisely. 130 Again, the attorney least impressed with the local rule said that there

is a great deal of formal discovery after informal discovery because the lawyers
have not divulged much information, and therefore they typically have to do a
great deal of follow-up.

13l

There also were mixed views about the continuing reporting duty. Some
said that attorneys generally observed the continuing duty, and that it allowed
the lawyers to engage in their own case management; another said that the duty
was relevant only if the attorneys initially complied with the letter and the spirit
of the rule; and another lawyer said that the continuing reporting duty did not
132
work as a practical matter.
The lawyers had a number of suggestions for improving the local rule based
on their experience. All believed that more active supervision by judges would
improve the efficiency of an informal discovery rule. One attorney suggested a
requirement that the lawyers meet with the judge a specific number of days or
months before trial to discuss informal discovery. 13 3 Another attorney suggested the need for a more explicit, active monitoring mechanism. 134 In addition, this attorney suggested a contempt sanction for noncompliance and
recommended that judges use sanctions more often to ensure compliance with
the intent of the rule. Finally, one attorney commented that the time limits in
the current Florida rule are "too quick."' 135 This attorney pointed out that lawyers do not realistically know enough about their cases ninety days after filing to
encourage meaningful exchange and disclosure of information. Thus, this critic
favored an informal discovery rule with stages of required discovery.
The sample of Florida attorneys interviewed was too small to draw any
general conclusions about the wisdom of an informal discovery rule. Their
anecdoctal impressions suggest positive prospects for a well-structured rule.
130. Interviews with attorneys, supranotes 107-08. Mr. Davidson said that the extent of formal

discovery after the local rule exchaage depended on the case. Interview with Barry Davidson, supra

note 107. If the rule is followed properly, all that might remain is a "reasonably framed set of
interrogatories" or very narrow document requests. He said that after informal discovery, the lawyer usually asks for "anything else" that has not come through rule 14 discovery. Id. Mr. Josefsberg
indicated that rule 14 eliminates much subsequent discovery, if it is used correctly, although he said
that the Florida lawyers nonetheless would use all the available types of formal discovery afterwards.
Interview with Bob Josefsberg, supra note 107. Du Fresne stated that there is formal discovery after
rule 14 discovery, but that rule 14 makes that discovery more focused and intelligent. Interview
with Elizabeth du Fresne, supra note 108. She said that rule 14 does not limit the discovery an
attorney normally would undertake.
131. Interview with Mike Nachwalter, supra note 107. Nachwalter also added that much information comes from post-rule 14 discovery because attorneys do not divulge much information initially. Id.
132. Interviews with attorneys, supra notes 107-08. With regard to the continuing reporting
duty, Ms. du Fresne stated that this portion of the rule encouraged attorneys to engage in case
management. Interview with Elizabeth du Fresne, supra note 108. Mr. Josefsberg suggested that
there was a continuing duty only if there had been compliance in the first instance. Interview with
Bob Josefsberg, supra note 107.
133. Interview with Mike Nachwalter, supra note 107. Mr. Nachwalter suggested that an informal discovery rule could work if there was more active supervision from the judges. Id.
134. Interview with Elizabeth du Fresne, supra note 108.
135. Interview with Mike Nachwalter, supra note 108.
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Their comments, however, also serve to flag potential problems with a
mandatory informal discovery requirement. The problems these practitioners
indicated are well worth additional investigation and thought before the Advi-

sory Committee promulgates a new, universal informal discovery rule that
would apply to every civil case in federal court.
C. Problems and Unresolved Issues ConcerningMandatory Informal
Discovery
The movement for promulgation of a mandatory informal discovery rule is
based on at least two assumptions. The first assumption is that the current civil
discovery rules are ineffective and counterproductive to their intended ends.
Thus, rather than promoting free and liberal discovery of information about a
case, contemporary federal practice instead encourages gamesmanship. Not
only does this violate the spirit of the 1938 discovery provisions, but it frustrates
the stated goals of the rules of procedure by encouraging injustice, delay, and
needless expense.
The second assumption underlying an informal discovery rule is that such a
rule somehow will help to cure prevailing discovery ills. In this regard, the Advisory Committee is demonstrating the triumph of hope over experience. Of all
the rules of civil procedure, the various discovery provisions have been amended
most frequently. 136 No matter how many times the Advisory Committee
redrafts the discovery rules, discovery abuse continues unabated, 137 as lawyers
create new ways to circumvent the rules. Only an Advisory Committee with an
aspirational vision of professional conduct could hope that a new mandatory
informal discovery provision will succeed where previous discovery reforms
have failed to modify abusive lawyering tactics.
The fact that previous attempts at discovery reform have failed to curb discovery abuse should not deter further attempts to reform civil discovery to function as the rule-drafters intended. Fifty years of experience with discovery
reform, however, should provide a cautionary note: the Advisory Committee
might well seek the root causes for discovery abuse because cure follows proper
diagnosis.

The proposed informal discovery rule presents unresolved research issues as
well as several lurking problems. The tentative information elicited from local
Florida practitioners, for example, suggests questions about the effectiveness of
local rules. If the Florida rule was drafted to institutionalize a pre-existing local
practice among attorneys because of court congestion from criminal cases, then
the experience of California practitioners should be compared if the California
local rule was not formulated for that reason. Before dismissing the rule on this
basis, the experience of California practitioners should be examined, because the
California local rule may have been adopted for a reason other than congestion
136. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. advisory committee notes (indicating dates and reasons for
rule revisions).
137. See supra notes 70-71.
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in the courts from criminal cases. Moreover, the comments of the Florida practitioners raise the following issues:
(1) To what extent is compliance with the local informal discovery rule
merely technical or pro forma? What kind of information is disclosed and withheld when there is technical compliance?
(2) Have attorneys who are subject to the local rule developed techniques
for avoiding compliance with the spirit of the rule?
(3) To what extent does the local rule actually reduce formal discovery?

When, and under what circumstances, do lawyers believe that they must conduct responsibly further formal discovery after the opponent has made disclosures under the informal discovery rule?
(4) Under what circumstances are attorneys most likely to comply voluntarily with both the letter and the spirit of the rule? When not?
(5) If it is true that some percentage of federal practitioners simply ignore
the local informal discovery rule, what happens in these cases?
(6) What is or should be the role of judicial supervision of an informal
discovery rule? Should there be a monitoring system that includes sanctions?
What sanctions should be available for noncooperation?
The Advisory Committee is going forward with a proposed universal informal discovery rule without having done thoughtful analysis on these issues.
Rather, the Committee is proceeding with a new federal rule based largely on
the Committee's good intentions and anecdotal information from a handful of
practitioners and judges.
From a process standpoint, what should the Advisory Committee do before
it promulgates a new universal procedural rule? Should the Committee conduct
a more probing empirical study of the experience of local practitioners under
existing informal discovery rules? Will such research enhance the current ruledrafting process? In addition to further empirical study of existing experience,
should the Advisory Committee conduct a "procedural impact study"' 138 to assess the potential consequences of its proposed rule on future cases and litigants?
In this regard, what are the limitations of empiricism?
D.

An Informal Reprise: What Proposed Rule 25.1 Does and Does Not Do
With Regard to Civil Discovery

It is important to summarize what the proposed informal discovery rule is
intended to do and not do, in light of surfacing criticism.1 39 The proposed rule
is titled aptly, in that it simply would require prompt disclosure of evidence to
the other side. It is intended to require "show and tell," or as one commentator
suggested about discovery abuse in general, to end the reciprocal games of
138. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrrrEE, supra note 71, at 89-90 (calling for creation of an Office of Judicial Impact Assessment "in the judicial branch to advise Congress
on, inter alia, the effect of proposed legislation on the judicial branch and legislative drafting matters
likely to lead to unnecessary litigation").
139. See infra notes 143-77 and accompanying text (Part II).
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"twenty questions" and "hide and seek.' 14°
The rule is intended to end gamesmanship in the trial preparation process.
The proposed rule would require lawyers to disclose evidence and witnesses at

any early stage of litigation, and to continue to disclose evidence as it became
known. The imposition of sanctions for noncompliance puts bite into the new
proposed rule. Thus, if lawyers did not reveal what information they had when
they had it, then they could not use it at trial. The proposed rule is predicated
on aspirational standards of professionalism.
The rule would not cut off or eliminate formal discovery. Attorneys still

could resort to interrogatories, depositions, requests for admissions or documents, or physical and mental examinations. As with the Florida local rule, the
Advisory Committee anticipated that attorneys still would need to do formal
discovery after disclosure under proposed rule 25.1. The purpose of the proposed rule, however, is to reduce the amount of such formal discovery and the
wasteful expense of formal discovery churning. Moreover, the rule in no way

would abrogate existing privileges 14 1 and immunities. 142 The rule would not
require lawyers to disclose documents or witnesses that the federal rules traditionally have protected.
II. THE

ATTACK ON THE PROPOSED INFORMAL DISCOVERY RULE

The proposal for a mandatory informal discovery rule first was raised at the

November 1989 Advisory Committee meeting. The Committee discussed the
need for such a rule and authorized the Reporter to draft a proposed rule for the
June 1990 meeting. Consistent with the mandate for new Advisory Committee

openness, the Reporter drafted a proposed informal discovery rule and circu140. See Hazard, supra note 71, at 2240.
141. For example, the attorney-client privilege remained untouched. See FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1). That rule provides:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of
the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any party, including the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other
tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.
Id. (emphasis added).
142. For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 still provides for the work product
immunity:
Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) [concerning expert witnesses] of this rule, a
party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under
subdivision (b)(l) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for
another party or by or for that other party's representative (including the other party's
attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the
party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the
party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when
the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). For a discussion of the history of the work product immunity, see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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lated it to interested persons. This initial circulation elicited a response from a
public interest academician, who had attended the fall Advisory Committee
meeting and there made a spirited plea for public participation in the rulemaking
process. 14 3 This public interest advocate strenuously criticized the proposed informal discovery rule, flexing some participatory muscle that heralds similar interest group lobbying on future rule reform. This singular response seemed
disproportionate to the proposed rule reform, like aiming artillery cannon at a
fieldmouse.
A.

The Public Interest Critique

There can be little doubt that the public interest law perspective inspired
this initial salvo volleyed at the proposed informal discovery rule. 14 This perspective views litigation through a decidedly political lens that pits
unempowered, resourceless individuals against big institutional litigants with
vast financial resources. The public interest critique of procedural rules reflects
an ideology that litigation embodies class, race, gender, and economic struggles.
The basic theory of public interest partisans is that there are no such things as
"facially neutral rules." 145 Criticism of the proposed informal discovery rule
proceeds from this perspective.
The public interest criticism of the proposed informal discovery rule makes

three essential points: (1) that the rule would create a tactical litigation imbalance because it would require only the disclosure of favorable evidence; (2) that
the rule would have a disparate impact by supplanting formal discovery; and (3)
that the rule's sanctions would not work because cases do not come to trial.
These criticisms misstate the proposed rule, distort the drafters' intentions, and
misrepresent the likely consequences of the proposed rule.
143. This academician was Professor Laura Macklin, Associate Director, Institute for Public
Representation, Georgetown University Law Center. Professor Macklin also appeared on behalf of
the clinic and presented testimony and a prepared statement urging rulemaking reform during the
hearings on the Court Reform and Access to Justice Act of 1988. See Prepared Witness Statement,
Professor Laura Macklin, in Court Reform and Access to Justice Act: Hearings on H.R. 3152 (February 28, 1988), supra note 18, at 339-91.
144. See generally Tobias, supra note 22, at 271 n.2 (recognizing that the advisability and validity of public law litigation inspire controversy).
145. See id. at 270. Professor Tobias writes:
The public interest litigant is no longer a nascent phenomenon in American jurisprudence. Born of the need of large numbers of people who individually lack the economic
wherewithal or the logistical capacity to vindicate important social values or their own
specific interests through the courts, these litigants now participate actively in much federal
civil litigation: public law litigation. Despite the pervasive presence of public interest litigants, the federal judiciary has accorded them a mixed reception, particularly when applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Many federal courts have applied numerous
Rules in ways that disadvantage public interest litigants, especially in contrast to traditional litigants, such as private individuals, corporations, and the government.
Id. Professor Tobias defines public interest litigation as "lawsuits which seek to vindicate important
social values that affect numerous individuals and entities." Id. at 270 n.l. This statement and the
arguments of Professor Tobias's article support this author's thesis that some interest groups have
retreated from the courts as forums for social change and are repositioning to achieve their goals
through favorable modifications of the civil rules. See id. at 271 ("many courts have enforced numerous Rules in ways that have adversely affected public interest litigants").
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Such mischaracterizations jeopardize the Advisory Committee's work by
falsely imbuing proposed rules with political content. Equally disturbing is the
prospect that if these criticisms gain public currency, 146 the legitimacy of the
Advisory Committee will be undermined severely in its rule reform efforts.
1. The "Favorable Evidence" Criticism
The "favorable evidence" criticism is predicated on the belief that the rule
requires only disclosure of so-called "favorable evidence":
As you know, Draft Rule 25.1 establishes procedures for the prompt
disclosure of each party's own evidence (that is, evidence in the possession of that party, and favorable to that party), and contemplates, as a
corollary, significant reductions in the use of formal discovery tools
(particularly interrogatories and depositions) as of right. However,
Draft Rule 25.1 imposes no obligation upon a party to disclose evidence favorable to an adversary in litigation. 147
This criticism basically asserts that requiring parties to disclose only evidence
favorable to them would introduce a litigation imbalance that favors "informa-

tion-rich" litigants and disadvantages "information-poor" litigants. 148 "Information-rich" litigants, of course, are large corporate or governmental
institutions; "information-poor" litigants include plaintiffs who are pursuing em-

ployment, housing, and credit discrimination claims; allegations against government agencies; and product liability lawsuits.149
This view of the litigation landscape pits small, individual plaintiffs against
large, institutional defendants. If rule 25.1 is approved, information-poor liti-

gants will suffer disproportionately. In addition to financial restraints, these litigants will "also be dependent on the discretion of district judges for permission
to pursue fact-gathering through formal discovery."' 150 Thus, rule 25.1 will re146. An example of a criticism that has gained currency through repetition is that the 1983
amendments to rule 11 have adversely impacted civil rights and public interest law litigants. See.
e.g., Tobias, supranote 22, at 302-10 (selectively surveying empirical studies of the impact of rule 11
on classes of litigants).
147. Letter from Laura Macklin to Paul Carrington, at 2 (Mar. 20, 1990). "In this respect, the
draft rules differ[] substantially from Wayne Brazil's proposal in The Adversary Characterof Civil
Discovery: 4 Critiqueand Proposalsfor Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 348 (1978)." Id.
148. Id. at 3. The terms are Professor Mackin's. She draws the following distinction:
[Plarties who are likely to possess (or obtain through extra-judicial means) most of the
information necessary to prove or defend their positions ('information-rich litigants') and
parties who are not likely to possess (or secure through extra-judicial channels) most of tile
information necessary to prove or defend their positions ('information-poor litigants').
Id. Professor Macklin further suggests: "I suspect, although I have not seen any empirical work on
this type of question, that 'information-rich' and 'information poor' litigants are likely to be unevenly
distributed between various categories of cases and various types of disputants." Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 4. Professor Macklin describes current discovery procedure as imbued with inequality stemming from financial disparities:
Of course, under our current system there are similar, albeit less dramatic inequalities in
access to information necessary to prove one's case. However, the current inequalities stem
largely from financial limitations on the parties, and not from rules which themselves grant
advantage to parties in a stronger position to secure proof outside of formal discovery. For
this reason, litigants can currently use other measures, ranging from tape-recorded depositions to class actions, in efforts to overcome financial constraints on obtaining proof.
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suit in "disaster" for certain classes of litigants:
I do not think that one can overestimate the potential significance of
this type of shift to a discovery system premised largely on extra-judicial information gathering, obligatory disclosure of only favorable information, and sharp curtailments in formal discovery. For litigants
who need formal discovery tools to prove their cases, it will be a
disaster. 15 1
This attack on informal discovery misstates the provisions of the proposed
rule. The proposed rule nowhere says that a disclosing party would be required
to disclose "favorable evidence," and it does not say that a party would be required to disclose only favorable evidence. The language "favorable evidence"
simply does not appear anywhere in the proposed provisions and represents a
straw man that allows an attack on a rule the Advisory Committee has not
proposed.
The public interest advocates also tie the "favorable evidence" problem to
proposed elimination of formal discovery, 152 a combination of restrictions that
would enhance adversarial imbalance. This criticism also misrepresents the proposed rule, which in no way eliminates formal discovery. Raising and repeating
this spectre only could alarm the litigating bar about a possibility that the reform does not contemplate.
Finally, the criticism that the proposed rule would be a disaster for information-poor litigants is ironic. If anything, the proposed rule should give an
advantage precisely to this class of litigants, and if an imbalance occurred, it
should favor these litigants. The proposed rule is intended to induce "show-andtell" by all parties at the risk of subsequent evidence-preclusion for noncompliance. This is intended to force institutional defendants to disclose materials that
they otherwise might withhold until later in the litigation process, and thus prevent defendants from playing a financial delaying game.
Id. at 3-4.
151. Id. at 4. Professor Macklin proceeds to link these dire discovery consequences of the proposed informal discovery rule to rule 11 sanction problems. She draws the conclusion that a combination of these two rules will cause certain types of litigants, such as public interest litigants, to
forego suing in federal court. This is a variation of the "chilling effect" argument now prevalent
among rule 11 critics. See generally S. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE
THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at 77-91 (1989) (evalu-

ating the costs and collateral consequences of rule 11 implementation); LaFrance, FederalRule 11
and Public InterestLitigation, 22 VAL. U.L. REv. 331, 333 (1988) (supporting the general proposition that rule 11 serves as a restraint upon public interest litigation); Nelken, Sanctions Under

Amended FederalRule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and
Punishment, 74 GEO. L.. 1313, 1314 (1986) (discussing the potential "chilling effect" of the rule 11
amendments); Tobias, supra note 22, at 301-10 (examining the potential effects of and problems
concerning the rule 11 amendments); Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFFALO L.
REV. 485, 487 (1988-89) (claiming that the detrimental effects of the rule 11 amendments have been
undervalued); Vairo, Rule 11: A CriticalAnalysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 191-94 (1983) (an overview of
rule 11, its amendments, and its critics). The thesis is that the rulemakers are trying to use rule 11
sanctions and discovery curtailment to impede public interest litigation.
152. See infra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
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2. The "Supplanting Formal Discovery" Criticism
The second criticism of the proposed informal discovery rule contends that
it curtails formal discovery.15 3 The criticism is that the proposed rule "promotes disclosure of evidence (in lieu of some formal discovery)"; 1 54 contemplates "significant reductions in the use of formal discovery tools (particularly
interrogatories and depositions)"; 155 involves "sharp curtailments in formal discovery"; 1 56 may someday "supplant formal discovery"; 15 7 and materially
reduces the need for formal discovery devices. 158 As a result, information-poor
litigants would neither have an adversary's disfavorable proof, nor would they
be able to obtain such information through the usual discovery devices.
This criticism is disingenuous because it contains an element of truth that
artfully raises general alarm. It is indeed the major purpose of the proposed
informal discovery rule to reduce recourse to formal discovery, 59 but it is not
true that the rule cuts off formal discovery. The rule contemplates that formal
discovery would occur, but that it would be more focused, intelligent, and less
inefficient.
3. The "Ineffective Sanction" Criticism
The third criticism of the informal discovery rule is that the proposed sanction16° basically would be ineffective in achieving its intended ends, and instead
may encourage nondisclosure and gamesmanship. 161 The theory is that because
only a small percentage of cases go to trial, "litigants (and their lawyers) may
design strategies which assume they are unlikely to go to trial, and circumvent
162
the rule in this way."
This criticism hypothesizes a lawyer (presumably a major institutional de153. See Letter from Laura Macklin to Paul Carrington, at 2 (Mar. 20, 1990).
154. Id. at 1.

155. Id. at 2. Professor Macklin also talks about discovery tools "as of right," id., but it is
unclear just what she means by this. Discovery is not "by right."
156. Id. at 4.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 5. Professor Macklin suggests, incorrectly, that informal discovery somehow would
"obviate the need" for interrogatories and depositions:
Although I agree that some of the matters now covered by interrogatories and depositions
would be covered by the material specified for disclosure under Draft Rule 25.1, it is not
always the case that the need for such discovery devices is materially reduced by these
disclosures. For example, in the several kinds of cases which require plaintiffs to accumulate and analyze statistical proof from information largely in the defendant's possession,
access to the kinds of information specified for disclosure in Rule 25.1(a) (witness lists, fact
summaries, expert opinions, damage computations, and record descriptions) would not obviate the need for detailed interrogatories and responses.
Id. Even if everything Professor Macklin states is true, there is nothing in the proposed rule that
would prohibit the plaintiff in these circumstances from using subsequent interrogatories and deposi-

tions to obtain the information Professor Macklin described. Professor Macklin, however, suggests

the opposite: that the proposed informal discovery rule would cut off and deny necessary subsequent
discovery.
159. See supra text accompanying note 35.
160. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.

161. See Letter from Laura Macklin to Paul Carrington, at 5 (Mar. 20, 1990).
162. Id.
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fendant) who withholds information under the informal discovery rule, disregards the continuing disclosure requirement, and further does not cooperate in
formal discovery. Yet, assuming all this stonewalling, why would the information-poor plaintiff want to settle? At that point, going to trial would favor the
plaintiff because the defendant could not use evidence it had failed to disclose
within the rule's time constraints. The rule is intended to penalize the noncooperating adversary at trial by precluding late production of evidence and witnesses to prove claims or defenses. In this sense, the rule provides an incentive
for the cooperative party to litigate and a disincentive for the uncooperative
party to defend.
Nonetheless, this criticism seems valid in instances in which a defendant
decides to withhold harmful information that would not be needed at trial and
thus would not be threatened by potential exclusion. The sanctioning provision

would be effective only to the extent that a defendant's defenses or counterclaims
depended on withheld information.
The further criticism of the proposed sanction provision is that it would
lead to wasteful satellite litigation concerning whether a litigant had revealed

information in a timely fashion.1 63 Although it is difficult to predict the extent
of this hypothesized problem, it is also difficult to anticipate discovery disputes
of a magnitude that could not be resolved by a magistrate handling discovery
matters or by a judge at pretrial conference. 164 It is premature alarmism to
forecast that the new disclosure rule would lead to additional litigation consum1 65
ing "undue amounts of time and effort."
Finally, the professional vision that underlies these criticisms is disturbing.
While the Reporter and the Advisory Committee were drafting a proposed rule
that summons lawyers to the highest degree of professional conduct,1 66 the critique of that rule instead portrays litigators as shrewd game players. The proposed rule is under attack because this dismal vision of professionalism
precludes honest dealing. This is a vision of lawyering as realpolitik It is cynical to suggest that lawyers will not comply with the new informal discovery
provisions because it is not in their interests and because lawyers play hardball
litigation games. The point of the proposed rule is to refocus narrow litigant
interests in winning on broader systemic interests in the speedy, inexpensive, and
just resolution of disputes. Moreover, the purpose of the proposed rule is to end
the gamesmanship so prevalent under the current discovery rules. Ironically,
the critics oppose the rule because they believe lawyers engage in discovery
163. Id. Professor Macklin argues: "Additionally, it seems likely that in cases which do go to
trial, disputes about whether information was timely revealed, which place great emphasis on deciding when 'the information was revealed to or discovered by the disclosing party,' will consume undue
amounts of time and effort." Id.
164. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (governing pretrial conferences); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (independent discovery conference provisions). Both of these methods would continue to exist even with the
proposed new rule.
165. See supra note 163.
166. See FED. R. Civ. P. 25.1 Reporter's Note (Proposed Draft, Feb. 24, 1990) ("It would depend on an elevation of the professionalism of lawyers.").
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games. Thus, while the rule drafters commit the error of hope over experience,
its critics commit the error of experience over hope.
B.

The Callfor FurtherStudy: Is This Empirical Study Really Necessary?

One recommendation for addressing the proposed rule's identified ills is to
conduct further empirical study of discovery. 167 The call for empirical study
proceeded from a conception of litigation as pitting information-poor litigants
against information-rich litigants. Professor Macklin states:
I think it is imperative, if a rule such as Draft Rule 25.1 is to be pursued, that detailed empirical evidence be gathered as to the levels and
types of access that different kinds of litigants have, in different kinds

of cases, to means of obtaining the information necessary to prove their
cases without the use of formal discovery. I suspect that distinct patterns of uneven access would emerge in such empirical
studies, varying
168
considerably among different kinds of cases.
Professor Macklin further indicates that "studies of this type, by their very design, would need to illuminate the proof requirements of various categories of
litigation. These requirements are, of course, an amalgam of statutory and
judge-made law, premised on assumptions about access to evidence under our
169
current system of formal discovery."
This recommendation would require the Advisory Committee 170 to analyze
litigation by both case and litigant type. 17 1 This assumes not only some objectively identifiable "case types," but also assumes some objectively identifiable
"litigant types" and that these litigant types act similarly in certain types of
cases. In addition, researchers should investigate the "means of obtaining the
information necessary to prove [the litigants'] cases without the use of formal
167. See Letter from Laura Macklin to Paul Carrington, at 2-3 (Mar. 20, 1990) (discussing rule
11 and "new rule to promote disclosure of evidence (in lieu of some formal discovery)").
168. Id. at 3.
169. Id. By way of illustration, Professor Macklin explains: "In the employment discrimination
area, for example, current doctrines assume that plaintiffs will have access to forms of statistical
proof which rely heavily on information from the employer's files." Id.
170. Presumably, this would be conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, which is already disfavored because of the conclusions reached in its rule 11 empirical studies. See T. WILLOINO, THE
RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS 169-77 (1988); see also Letter from Laura Mackin to Professor
Carrington, at 2 (Mar. 20, 1990) (criticizing the conclusion that "[d]ata gathered by the Federal
Judicial Center and others tend to disprove the hypothesis that sanctions are more likely to befall
civil rights plaintiffs than others," based on Willging's statistics reported to the Advisory
Committee).
171. This is not impossible, at least as to the first criteria. The Administrative Office of the
United States Courts does keep statistics based on so-called "nature of suit" codes. This basically is a
label attached to the substantive basis for the complaint in federal court, such as antitrust, bankruptcy, civil rights, contract, personal injury, statutory actions, etc. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE UNIrED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE

OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS Table C-2 (1989) (civil cases commenced by basis ofjurisdiction
and nature ofsuit); id.Table C-2A (civil cases commenced by nature of suit, 1985 through 1989); id.
Table C-3 (civil cases commenced by nature of suit and district). There are many other tables supplied by the Administrative Office, breaking down the federal court caseload by nature of suit. See
id. Having said this, the use of "nature of suit" codes as a basis for case-specific empirical research is
fraught with problems, not the least of which are multiple-claim complaints and the broad nature of
some of the Administrative Office "nature of suit" categories.
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discovery,"' 72 a difficult empirical research design. Moreover, the call for further empirical study problematically assumes its conclusion: "I also suspect that
empirical studies of differential access to evidence outside of formal discovery
would tend to show individuals and other smaller litigants at a disadvantage vis17 3
a-vis larger, more institutional litigants with greater resources."

Because the request for an empirical study assumes "differential access to
evidence," the Advisory Committee should concede the point. Surely the Committee does not have to invoke the research apparatus of social science to prove
that institutional defendants outspend and delay in litigation against less wellheeled adversaries. Thus, the called-for empirical study would validate the obvious. The proposed informal discovery rule is intended to remedy discovery
abuse, not exacerbate it. Self-defining terms like "information-poor" and "information-rich" ultimately will prove disutilitarian or fallacious, because any litigant who refuses to divulge is "information-rich" and the opponent
"information-poor." This will be true without regard to case or litigant "type."
Why then this "imperative" call for further empirical study of the nondefinable and the obvious? Requests for empirical study, although invariably wellintended by their proponents, also serve to postpone solving the problem. Empirical research is labor-intensive, slow, and prone to methodological problems
that encourage disputes. Nonetheless, empirical research on rule reform is a
valid enterprise, 174 and there are instances in which empirical study could have
improved the rulemaking process. Yet, there should be more clear thinking
about when such research truly will enhance rule revision. If the Advisory
Committee is to commission empirical research on informal discovery, such research should study lawyers' compliance with the local California and Florida
rules. 175 Researchers might investigate why lawyers comply or do not comply
with the general federal discovery rules. An interesting empirical study could
explore why some lawyers act professionally and others do not. When the Advisory Committee has "empirical" answers to those questions, the rule reformers
will be better able to formulate provisions addressing discovery abuse.
Finally, the call for further empirical research on the proposed informal
discovery rule suggests that partisan political agendas are infusing the rulemaking process and challenging the longstanding trans-substantive philosophy of the
federal rules. 17 6 The call for a study based on "types" of litigation and "types"
of litigants was little more than a request for substance-based research. The
172. Letter from Laura Macklin to Paul Carrington, at 3 (Mar. 20, 1990).
173. Id.
174. See generally Walker, supra note 20, at 75-85 (proposing increased empirical studies of
federal procedural rules).
175. See supra notes 105-35 and accompanying text.
176. The accepted premise of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is that they are rules of
general applicability, without regard to kinds of cases or litigants; thus, they transcend particular
substantive law applications. This trans-substantive theory of the federal rules has been under attack, as is evidenced by a distinct literature. See generally Carrington, Making Rules, supranote 1,
at 2067-69 nn. 1-7 (summarizing Professor Cover's criticism of the federal rules); Cover, ForJames
Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 732-40 (1975) (discussing the efficacy of the trans-substantive approach taken by the federal rules).
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empirical study that the public interest advocates suggest rests on the theory
that trans-substantive rules are mistaken and that rules should be case-specific.
Although the recommendation was couched in a neutral-sounding request to
survey the entire litigation "landscape,"' 177 the proposed research design sought
a set of rules tailored to accommodate specific partisan litigation needs.
III. THE POLITICS OF RULEMAKING
The public interest attack on the proposed informal discovery rule,
presented in overblown rhetorical language, amounts to egregious overreaction.
The proposed rule was and is fairly innocuous, as proposed rules go.' 78 The
criticism levelled at the rule (and implicitly at the Reporter and the Advisory
Committee) is disproportionate to the suggested rule change. Under the critic's
version of the rule, the adjudicative process would be thrown into cosmic imbalance favoring corporate and governmental America. This is not true, but it does
suggest a kind of disturbing siege mentality.
Something else is going on here. What is happening, really, has little to do
with discovery reform, and much to do with politics. With the camel's head
now in the tent, the Advisory Committee can expect similar challenges to draft
rules, repeated calls for dubious empirical studies, and continued criticism for
fostering rules with disparate litigant impact. 179 The Advisory Committee now
will be on the defensive. How has this come to pass, and is it a desirable change?
A.

Opening the Rulemaking Process

The most recent efforts to democratize the rulemaking process occurred
with the passage of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act.'8 0
During 1987-88, witnesses appeared before the House Subcommittee on Courts,
177. This request suggests by implication, of course, that this is not something the Advisory

Committee already does.
178. By contrast, the proposals for reform of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (summary
judgment), for example, would change substantially the language and standards of summary judgment procedure. Compare Stempel, A DistortedMirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of
Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 187-93
(1988) (criticizing early proposed revisions to rule 56) with Carrington, Making Rules, supra note 1,
at 2121 n.18 (criticizing Stempel for premature attack on drafting efforts for this rule).

179. See Letter from Laura Macklin to Paul Carrington, at 4-5 (Mar. 20, 1990). As Professor
Macklin observes:
However, if'informal discovery' (e.g. obligatory disclosure) is ever to supplant formal discovery, then I think we must design ways to ensure that the information exchange enables
both parties in the litigation to prove their case. Failing this, facially neutral rules of the
type contained in Draft Rule 25.1 will have a widely, and I think predictably, disparate
impact.
Id.
180. See supranotes 13-14 and accompanying text. This was not the first time that Congress had

been lobbied to open the rulemaking process as criticisms of the secretive nature of the rulemaking
process are longstanding. See generally W. BROWN, supra note 2, at 42-58 (discussing bills introduced in the 96th Congress that also attempted to open the process); see also Carrington, Making
Rules, supra note 1, at 2073 ("Since Congress's 1974 enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
there has been controversy regarding the process. Some observers have gone so far as to describe a
counterrevolution against rulemaking.").
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Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice'" to lobby for amendment of
the Rules Enabling Act, the statute authorizing judicial rulemaking. 182
Although a major theoretical battleground was the proposed repeal of the Act's
supersession clause,18 3 interested parties also lobbied to open the rulemaking
process. In particular, witnesses requested that the Advisory Committee provide earlier access to the rule-drafting process to enhance meaningful public
1 84
participation.
A report by the Committee on Federal Courts of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York summarizes three major criticisms of the rulemaking
process: (1) the closed nature of the rulemaking process; (2) the proliferation of
a multiplicity of local rules; and (3) the continued vitality of the supersession
clause.1 85 Regarding the closed nature of the rulemaking process, the chief criticism is a lack of consultation with the practicing bar or consultation with only a
limited segment of the bar. The complaint was that most practitioners were
181. See Court Reform andAccess to Justice Act: Hearingson HR. 3152 Before the Subcomm.

on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm on the Judiciary,
100th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 3-343 (1987-88) [hereinafter Hearings on H.. 3152 (testimony of
witness)].

182. See supra notes 15-16.
183. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). Section 2072 states, in relevant part:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district courts
and courts of appeals of the United States in civil actions....
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution.
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such
rules have taken effect.
Id. The proposed amendment to the supersession clause would have changed the language to read:
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right or supercede
[sic] any provision of a law of the United States except any rule of practice or procedure or
evidence in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of the Rules Enabling Act of
1987.
The rule was amended to read as follows:
§ 2072. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE; POWER TO PRESCRIBE
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice
and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including
proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws
in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken
effect.
Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. IV, § 401(a), 102 Stat. 4648 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988)). The proponents of repeal of the supersession clause thus did not prevail in
Congress. For a discussion of the supersession controversy, compare Carrington, "Substance" and
"Procedure," supra note 1, at 322-26 (drawing a distinction among statutory provisions to be superseded) with Burbank, supra note 1, at 1036-46 (criticizing Carrington's view of supersession).
184. See, eg., Hearingson H.R. 3152 (testimony of witness), supra note 181, at 360-68, 389-90
(testimony and prepared statement of Prof. Laura Macklin, Georgetown Univ. Law Center); id. at
1321-31 (Amendments to the Rules EnablingActs, a report by the Committee on Federal Courts of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York outlining three criticisms of the rulemaking
process, January 1988).
185. Id. at 1321-31 (report of the Committee on Federal Courts). The report called for more
openness in the rulemaking process and a curb on the proliferation of local rules, but did not endorse
repeal of the supersession clause.
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"shut out of the rulemaking process, although they were litigating on a daily
basis in the federal courts." 186 The report states: "Similar criticisms have been
directed toward the various advisory committees. Not only have there been
complaints of elitism, but there also have been complaints of 'calcification' be187
cause of the infrequent turnover of membership on the advisory committees."
Other criticisms attacked the inadequate notice of committee meetings, agenda,
as well as inadequate notice and comment periods
and proposed rule revisions,
88
for proposed rules.'
Section 2073 of the Judicial Improvements Act delineated amendments for
greater participation in the rulemaking process.18 9 A proposed provision would
have required that the Advisory Committees "consist of a balanced cross section
of the bench and bar, and trial and appellate judges," 190 but that provision ultimately was deleted from the final legislation. 191 The reforms enacted require
that meetings of the Standing Committee and Advisory Committees be open to
the public unless a majority of the Committee determines that it is in the public
interest to close the meeting. 192 In addition, the new rules require sufficient
notice of forthcoming committee meetings; the recording and availability of
minutes; and a record of the reasons for and dissents from newly amended or
promulgated rules. 193 Thus, what openness advocates lost in committee repre-

sentativeness, they gained in participatory process.
Against this legislative backdrop, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
reconvened in November 1989 under the mandates of the Judicial Improvements Act. The Committee's Reporter circulated a memorandum to Committee
members raising questions about the rulemaking process and the implications of
the 1988 legislation for the Committee's work. 194 The Reporter's concerns cen186. Id. at 1322.
187. Id. The charge of calcification is somewhat unfounded. Since the beginning of Justice

Rehnquist's tenure as Chief Justice, membership on the Advisory Committees has been for a twoyear term. If anything, these short terms and committee membership churning frustrate the development of institutional memory and lead to replowing of old ground as new members join the committees. In addition, the current Reporter has stated that it takes about three years for any

particular rule reform to work its way through the multi-tiered rulemaking process. This means that
a number of committee members never participate in a rule revision from beginning to end. See

Hearings on H.R. 3152: Carrington Statement, supra note 1, at 1252; Carrington, Making Rules,
supra note 1, at 2119.

188. See, ag., Hearingson H.R. 3152 (testimony of witness), supranote 181, at 345-68 (prepared
statement of Prof. Laura Macklin).

189. A predecessor version of the draft language of H.R. 3152 was in the Rules Enabling Act of
1985, H.R. 3550, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. Rac. HI 1396-98 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1985); see also
Carrington, Making Rules, supra note 1, at 2076 n.50 ("Proposed amendments to the Rules En-

abling Act aimed to make the Advisory Committee more 'representative.'

").

190. Carrington, Making Rules, supra note 1,at 2076 n.50.
191. See Rules Enabling Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 401, 102 Stat. 4648, 4649 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1990)). Of the Advisory Committee's composition, the current Reporter

writes: "The Committee is now more diverse than it was, but representativeness in this context may
be illusory." Carrington, Making Rules, supra note 1,at 2076-77 n.50.
192. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c)(1) (1990); see also supra note 15 (quoting statute).

193. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c)(1)-(d); see also supra note 15 (quoting statute).
194. See Reporter, Memorandumr to Civil Rules Committee re Questions About the Rulemaking
Process (October 18, 1989) [hereinafter Memorandum to Civil Rules Committee]. This memoran-

dum was part of a package of materials and rule revisions the Reporter submitted to the Committee
in October 1989. The Reporter stated the following purpose of the memorandum:
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tered on three topics: (1) implications of the new openness requirements; (2)
philosophical questions about the nature of judicial rulemaking; and (3) implica-

tions for the Advisory Committee's relationship with Congress.
1. Implications of the New Openness
With regard to the openness mandate, the Reporter acknowledged prevailing criticisms of the Advisory Committee's proceedings: that the "ancestral Ad-

visory Committee was extremely discreet in its work"; that the Reporter worked
in a "closeted" fashion; that no committee drafts circulated until a final copy
was ready; that the period for public comment was brief and inconsequential;
and that the Committee's position was cemented prior to public comment periods. 195 Summarizing, the Reporter concluded: "Thus, at times past, judicial

rulemakers may have seemed to some of their public to be rather arrogant and
indifferent to the views of others." 196
The Reporter described various efforts to expand the Committee's reach,
such as public committee meetings, circulation of draft rules, 197 and visits with

bar groups interested in rule reform. 198 Notwithstanding these efforts, the Reporter sought the Committee's guidance concerning draft rule revisions and

open meetings. In particular, the Reporter signalled a concern about the possible effects of "soliciting views" and thereby "creating unwelcome pressure on
the work of the Committee."' 199 The Reporter identified another potential im-

plication of this new openness-that Committee attempts at being responsive
might prove counterproductive:
Indeed, perhaps implicit in any effort at openness is an obligation to be
The Rules Enabling Act of 1988 contains a number of provisions bearing on the work
of the Civil Rules Committee. The Committee has not since the enactment of that law had
an opportunity to discuss its implications. This memorandum is intended as brief stimulus
to your thoughts as preparation for that discussion. It may be undesirable as well as unnecessary to come to closure on any of the issues, but they appear to need ventilation
nonetheless. It would at the very least be helpful to the Reporter to have a better sense of
the Committee's collective expectations about the scope of its (and the Reporter's efforts)
to respond to the reactions of users of the Rules.

Id. at 11.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 11. The circulation of draft rule revisions seems to be a particular bane of the current
Reporter. In his memorandum to Committee members, he noted that "the Reporter does circulate
drafts that are, alas, sometimes perceived by observers to be the work of the Committee when they
are not." Id. The Reporter also suggested at the November meeting that he was bothered by what
he perceived as premature comment and criticism of draft rules, citing an incident described in
Carrington, Making Rules, supra note 1,at 2121 n.18 ("This process sometimes leads to premature
comment."). Also at the November meeting, when questioned about the extent of it, the Reporter
indicated that he circulated drafts to a short list of interested persons, chiefly but not exclusively
academicians. He indicated that at one time his list had been longer, but that he had shortened the
circulation list because he was not getting a great deal of response.
198. Memorandum to Civil Rules Committee, supra note 194, at 12. Once the standing committee has approved the proposed rules, they are published for comment and hearings are announced
and held in various cities. There has been a movement to hold some hearings at the same time and
place of various professional meetings likely to include bar members and others interested in rule
reform. See Carrington, Making Rules, supra note 1, at 2122.
199. See Memorandum to Civil Rules Committee, supra note 194, at 12. The Reporter further
noted: "That may have been the opinion of those who held the early reporters in the closet." Id.
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responsive to the views of persons not in the rulemaking process.
Some members of the Committee may perhaps wisely prefer to minimize contact with outside views lest it assume an obligation to react to
those views when tendered. Certainly there is a risk in magnifying an

offense by soliciting views that are doomed to be ignored. 2
With Congress having mandated who should be heard and when, the Reporter was now raising the more subtle, problematic question of "what does it
mean to be heard?" Fueling the Reporter's concern was the constitutional tension inherent when an Article III body, namely a judicial committee, engaged in
a process that closely resembled an Article I function, namely legislationdrafting.
2. Judicial Rulemaking and the Politics of Procedure
The Reporter's second concern focused on the issue of superimposing a
political process on judicial branch members not accustomed to norms of legislative drafting. As the Reporter conceived the problem, "[t]he former secrecy of
the Committee was highly congenial to judges and judicial institution because it
is so appropriate to adjudication that involves private rights. ' 20 1 The adjudicative process is therefore a "false model" for rulemaking, because the Advisory
Committee's task is to draft essentially legislative rules, not issue adjudicative
judgments. 20 2 In the Reporter's view, the adjudicative function is the antithesis
of the new rulemaking process: "The work product of rulemaking is not judgments, but rules that look a lot like the work product of Article I
'20 3
institutions.
The question raised by the Reporter essentially was whether it was appropriate for the Advisory Committee, consisting chiefly of judicial branch members, to become more like a congressional legislative committee in its operations.
The Reporter asked: "Perhaps the Committee should actively seek better information about the reactions of users of the process to the rules and to the conduct
'2 4
of the courts, much as Congress often does by inviting testimony, etc." 0
200. Id.
201. Id. Or, in other words, judges render decisions deliberately immune from the pressures of
partisan interest groups. Couching this concept in a constitutional cloak, Professor Cardngton
observed:

Because the Court can decide only 'cases or controversies' and holds no commission in the
constitutional scheme to enact laws or rules favoring or disfavoring specific groups of litigants, its role in rulemaking is to shield the process from the influence of organized groups
seeking to shape the judicial process.
Carrington, Making Rules, supra note 1, at 2076.
202. See Memorandum to Civil Rules Committee, supra note 194, at 12.
203. Id.
204. Id. Recognizing the relative isolation of the Advisory Committee and thejudiciary's lack of
experience with the legislative process, the Reporter additionally suggested:
Arguably the committee has a higher duty in this regard than does Congress with respect
to matters within its purview, because there is no established channel of communication,
nor much in the way of organization by litigants and lawyers except through the organized
bar that could be used to bring their influence to bear on the rules.
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3.

Relationship with Congress: Substance and ,Procedure

The possibility of enhanced politicization of the rulemaking process was
related to the Reporter's chief worry about the appropriate relationship between
the Advisory Committee and Congress. 20° The Reporter's sense was that Congress had been exercising greater authority in rule revision and that "[i]f that
practice is applied to the Civil Rules with any frequency at all, the Civil Rules
will soon be decorated with special interest legislation." 206, Having flexed its
rulemaking muscle, Congress now was more accustomed to entertaining procedural rule legislation. The Reporter suggested this shift to congressional subcommittees, replete with interest group lobbying, would have predictable, dire
consequences for the civil rules: "This is a fate that befell the Field Code in New
York in the 19th century, and it is an accident waiting to happen to federal
'207
reform now."
Viewing these developments, the Reporter identified a "substantial sea
change in the last half century." For fifty years, the Advisory Committee's rec-

ommendations had carried great weight, and the Committee's secrecy was
thought appropriate to this work.208 The Committee's unchallenged authority
derived from a belief in the distinction between substantive and procedural
law, 20 9 and a belief that the Advisory Committee was engaged in promulgating

procedural rules of general applicability. What had changed, in the Reporter's
view, were recent challenges to the trans-substantive philosophy of the federal
rules, challenges that inevitably would politicize the rulemaking process:

Those few who observe judicial rulemaking are far more likely today to
205. The Reporter stressed that "[a]t the moment, personal relations with both House and Senate Committees seems [sic] to be positive." Id. at 13.
206. Id. The Reporter acknowledged that Congress regularly amends the rules of criminal procedure on its own initiative. As recent examples of congressional initiative in the rulemaking process, the Reporter pointed to the 1983 amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, which
resulted from successful lobbying by the National Association of Process Servers for favorable provisions in the rule 4 amendments, defeating versions of the rule that had gone through the Judicial
Conference and the Supreme Court. See infra notes 255-59 and accompanying text. In 1988 Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 35, a discovery provision relating to physical and mental exams, was
amended by a rider to drug legislation. This change in the procedural rule was accomplished, the
Reporter stated, at the request of a single Senator and without any hearings on the change. See
Memorandum to Civil Rules Committee, supra note 194, at 13; infra notes 270-75 and accompanying text. Extensive interest group lobbying in Congress concerning proposed changes in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 68, the "offer of judgment" rule, caused the Advisory Committee to abandon its rule revision efforts. See Burbank, supra note 1, at 1037-40; Carrington, Making Rules, supra
note 1, at 2078-79; Tobias, supra note 22, at 310-16. Also illustrative of interest group lobbying in
Congress is a proposed amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, the general pleading rule,
advanced by asbestos manufacturers, that would require a sample of the offensive material to be
attached to the complaint. See Memorandum to Civil Rules Committee, supra note 194, at 13.
207. Memorandum to Civil Rules Committee, supra note 194, at 13; see Subrin, David Dudley
Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an EarlierProcedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST.
REv. 311, 327-34 (1988).
208. The Reporter suggested, "All its actions were accepted, despite or perhaps because it was
secretive and unresponsive." Memorandum to Civil Rules Committee, supra note 194, at 13.
209. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1965) (holding that, for purposes of the
Erie doctrine, under the Rules Enabling Act, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern procedure,
not substance); Carrington, Making Rules, supra note 1, at 2067-87 (discussing the rulemaking procedures); Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure," supra note I, at 284-88 (discussing the difference between substance and procedure in the context of case law and the Rules Enabling Act).
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see social and economic consequences in what the Committee does
than were earlier generations of observers. The substance-procedure
line was never clear, and was never constant in its application to different contexts; but it also may be that its meaning has changed over the
years, with more matters
being perceived to be substantive than may
2 10
once have been true.
In light of these changed circumstances affecting the rulemaking process,
the Reporter suggested two approaches for the Advisory Committee. First, it
was essential that the Advisory Committee not become politicized nor implement any interest group agenda. The Reporter stated:
One thing it [the Advisory Committee] cannot do is to become itself
into a genuine political institution with its own social and economic
agenda. The Committee should perhaps redouble its resolution to stay
well within its commission to improve the effectiveness of the courts in
enforcing whatever commands may be uttered by Congress, but to
avoid consciously effecting any social or political
policy bearing on the
2 11
extrinsic interests of any group of litigants.
Second, the Reporter suggested that the Advisory Committee would do
well to undertake only rule revisions "sufficiently technocratic and apolitical."' 2 12 In determining which rule revisions met these tests, the Reporter pro-

posed that the Committee "listen and count the decibels.

213

Thus, any

potential rule revision raising enough public clamor would signal both the political nature of the proposed revision and that the Advisory Committee should let
the political branch, Congress, mediate the clamor. 214 As a corollary, the Reporter recommended that the Advisory Committee refer all "marginally sub21 5
stantive matters" to Congress.
B.

The Advisory Committee Dilemma

The Reporter's Memorandum to the Civil Rules Committee outlines the Advisory Committee's dilemma after the 1988 Judicial Improvements Act. Congress now has mandated that the Advisory Committee open its process to
enhanced participation. In essence, Congress has required the Advisory Committee to act more like a congressional committee, or else the locus of rulemak210. Memorandum to Civil Rules Committee, supranote 194, at 13-14. The Reporter suggested
that the 1966 amendments to rule 23 now would probably be impossible to revise through the Advisory Committee processes because of the perceived political implications of such a rule revision. In

support of this conjecture, the Reporter pointed to the recent battle of possible rule 68 amendments:
"The fracas over Rule 68 tends to confirm that Rule 23 would not make it today." Id. at 14.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. Again sounding the alarm at the potential for increased politicization of the rulemaking
process in the Advisory Committee, the Reporter noted that "[s]everal members of the Committee
have suggested that it may be especially important to listen to bar groups who are the only constituencies that might have the will and capacity to protect rulemaking from being savaged by special

interests." Id.
215. Id. This, of course, suggests the ability of the Advisory Committee both to calibrate decibels in some meaningful fashion, and to discern which proposed rule revisions are "marginally
substantive."

1991]

INFORMAL DISCOVERY

ing power will shift even further into congressional hands. This forced new
openness tacitly acknowledges the "sea change" identified by the Committee's
Reporter: recognizing that so-called facially neutral rules are not truly neutral;
that procedural rules affect substantive outcomes; and that there is no such thing
2 16
as apolitical rule revision.
The Reporter's Memorandum reflects disparate visions of procedural justice. The reigning sensibility for fifty years of federal rulemaking has been an
ethos of elitism and secrecy; of closeted, deliberative efforts by a committee of
experts. The reigning vision of federal rules has been one of trans-substantive
rules of general applicability and flexibility. 2 17 The contemporary critique is
that rulemaking should be more democratic and include greater community representation. This critique argues that trans-substantive rules have proved disutilitarian or unfair, and therefore rules should be case- and litigant-specific.
It is apparent that the Advisory Committee cannot carry out its mandate
unless it becomes more politically attuned. The Reporter's suggestion that the
Committee "listen to the decibels" is troubling, however, because if the experience of the proposed informal discovery rule is any indication, the Advisory
Committee should prepare for a good deal of clamor. Listening to the decibels is
bound to fail because interest groups will politicize every potential rule reform.
The Advisory Committee simply cannot evade political reality by shunting all
controverted or "marginally substantive" proposals to Congress. If the critics
are correct, then all procedural rules are more than "marginally substantive."
By evading responsibility, the Advisory Committee will become insignificant in
the rulemaking process.
Furthermore, if the Advisory Committee chooses to acknowledge the newly
politicized nature of the rulemaking process, the Committee necessarily will be
forced to retreat from the reigning vision of trans-substantive rules. Interest
group lobbyists represent partisan interests and necessarily will pressure for interest-specific procedural rules. The Advisory Committee's dilemma, then, is
this: On the one hand, it can largely ignore the new openness and shunt all

potentially controversial rule reforms to Congress. If this happens, the Advisory
Committee will become an ineffective third branch institution. On the other
hand, the Advisory Committee can embrace the new openness, meet interest
group demands for substance-specific rules, and retreat from more than fifty
years of trans-substantive philosophy.
C.

The Rulemaking Process: Two Views

Central to the incipient politicization of the judicial rulemaking process are
the questions of who should make the rules and by what process. These questions certainly are not new,2 18 but they have been reopened with fresh urgency
in the context of the "sea change" in attitudes about the Federal Rules of Civil
216. Id. at 13-14.
217. See Carrington, MakingRules, supranote 1,at 2079-85 (discussing the principle that procedural rules should have general applicability).
218. See supra note 9.
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Procedure. In the past, academicians have described two simplistic models of

rulemaking: one a participatory model and the other less so. Each model embodies certain assumptions about the rulemaking process and the consequences
of that process. These models have surfaced as competing visions of the
rulemaking function, with the participatory model endorsed through the Judicial Improvements Act. 2 19 Because the law now requires an enhanced participatory model, the Advisory Committee will have to rethink its traditional
rulemaking processes.
1. Rulemaking as a Participatory Process
The participatory model, in general, seeks to open the judicial rulemaking
process to broader participation and to subject the work of the various rulemaking bodies to meaningful scrutiny.220 From this perspective, "[d]emocratic government presumes public participation in the affairs of government, and it
assumes the ultimate accountability of those who govern to the public in whom
sovereignty rests."'22 1 The participatory model sweeps broadly from principles
of democratic government, writ large, to principles of rulemaking, writ small. In
so doing, the model disregards the type of legislative or administrative nature of
2 22
rulemaking.
The participatory model has at least three central themes. The first theme is
that a diverse, pluralistic society requires pluralism in rule promulgation. A
proponent of broadening the civil rulemaking process has stated:
During this century, the business of the courts has become more diverse, their impact has expanded into new areas, people have come to
recognize the importance of what they do .... Thus people other than
judges and lawyers are closely involved
with the courts and are seeking
223
to participate in their management.
2 24
This view, then, rejects rulemaking by elites with special expertise.
The second central theme of the participatory model is that procedural
rules have substantive content and consequences:
Perhaps the major impetus for re-examination of the rule-making process has been a realization that rules can have important consequences.
Courts tend to look on them as a means to establish efficient procedures, but even matters appropriately defined as procedure
often in225
volve policy judgments with far reaching consequences.
The logic is simple. If procedural rules embody policy judgments affecting sub219. See supra notes 13-16.
220. See Lesnick, supra note 9, at 580-84.
221. Wheeler, supra note 9, at 281.
222. But see id. (recognizing that "courts... are different from the other branches of government in several respects. Some of their basic purposes are anti-democratic, or at least anti-

majoritarian.").
223. See id. at 282. This same general theme is used to dismiss the older view that rule drafting
should be the province of experts. See A. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL AD-

MINISTRATION (1949).
224. See Wheeler, supra note 9, at 282.
225. Id. at 283.
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stantive interests, then participatory rulemaking is required to ensure that such
policy judgments be fully informed and fair.
The third theme is that judicial rulemaking really is a "legislative process."'2 26 One commentator described the significance of this notion:
Legislative, as used here, does not imply that rule-making necessarily
belongs in the legislature. It means instead that rule-making, by its
nature, is a process of developing general rules for application to a
variety of specific situations. A legislative process, at least in227
the ideal,
is characterized by broad participation by affected interests.
The syllogism is that all legislative efforts require broad participatory process;
judicial rulemaking is legislative; therefore, judicial rulemaking requires broad
participatory process. Legislative process as understood in the congressional
setting22 8 should be the model for legislative efforts, either by the executive
branch in administrative rulemaking 229 or by the judicial branch in judicial
rulemaking. Central to this participatory model is effective access to the lawmaking process, including adequate notice of pending legislation, open hearings,
meaningful opportunity for comment, and accountability by the lawmakers. In
Congress, this means the ability of partisan interests to influence representatives
accountable at the next election.
Reformers of the judicial rulemaking process consistently have urged
changes to make judicial rulemaking resemble legislative branch lawmaking.
These recommendations have included calls to better publicize Judicial Conference procedures; increase the representativeness of the rules committees; actively
seek diverse comments; provide public hearings; permit early participation in the
drafting process; open all meetings of the advisory and standing committees;
provide for subsequent notice and comment on redraftings; afford published
minutes and reports reflecting dissenting opinions; and allow opportunity for
2 30
agenda-setting.
After many years,2 31 the rulemaking reformers successfully lobbied their
case with Congress. Indeed, the experience of the Judicial Improvements Act
makes the point nicely about the effectiveness of lobbying on legislative outcomes in Congress. Interest groups lobbied Congress for the right, in effect, to
lobby the Advisory Committee, and the partisans of partisanship won the day.
With regard to the rulemaking process, the reformers demonstrated that participatory process works because the Judicial Improvements Act of 1988 incor226. Id. at 285.
227. Id.
228. See, e.g., E. REMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION (1973).
229. See Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure," supra note 1, at 303-04 (contrasting
rulemaking in the administrative agency setting, which is "avowedly designed to foster explicit, special substantive aims").
230. See, eg., W. BROWN, supra note 2, at 103-38 (describing various proposals for reformation
of the judicial rulemaking process); Lesnick, supra note 9, at 580-84; Wheeler, supra note 9, at 28587; Hearings on HR. 3152 (testimony of witness), supra note 181, at 344-90 (witness testimony and
prepared statement of Prof. Laura Macklin).
231. The last major attempt to reform the rulemaking process occurred in the 1970s as a result
of dissension over promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See supra note 12.

840

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

porates the essential rulemaking reform proposals, except for enhanced
representativeness of the Advisory Committee. 232 Having succeeded in Congress, interest groups now may take their rule reform issues to the Advisory
Committee. The question remains whether the Committee, long accustomed to
functioning under a judicial rulemaking model, can accommodate itself to substantially changed rules of the game.
233
2. Rulemaking as Undemocratic Legislation

The traditional judicial rulemaking model proceeds from different assumptions, reaches different conclusions, and suffers the public-relations liability of
being perceived as undemocratic. 234 This model does not recognize a superior
claim for participatory process based on a conflation of all types of rulemaking
in all forums. Nor does this model accept that representation and enhanced
participation are process values that necessarily flow from a characterization of a
function as legislative.
Three perspectives, markedly different from the participatory model, characterize the traditional judicial rulemaking model. The first is a deep skepticism
about the importance of the substance-procedure distinction in judicial rulemaking. Thus, where participatory advocates see procedural rules as substantive and
therefore requiring broader input, the traditionalists dismiss this interpretation
as unduly manipulative of both the Erie doctrine2 35 and the requirements of the
Rules Enabling Act. 236 From this standpoint, while it is possible to identify
some "interesting and engaging questions in locating the boundaries of 'procedure,' ",237 as a practical matter this typically is not a problem. In contrast to
their participatory colleagues, the traditionalists know a procedural rule when
they see it. Moreover, if they have any doubts, they are more willing to assess
the rule "contextually," rather than to concede universally that procedural rules
have substantive effect. 238 To them, procedural rulemaking, lacking substantive
content or impact, can lay no special claim to participatory process. Rather, a
proponent of this model concludes that where the process involves purely procedural rules, that process deliberately should be immunized from partisan
232. See supra notes 13-16.
233. The term and concepts are from Hazard, supra note 17.
234. Having skeptical reservations about the wisdom of enhanced participatory democracy is
like taking pot-shots at Mom, apple pie, and the flag. See Hazard, supra note 17, at 1291 ("[W]ho
could be against more public 'input' or more 'representative' Advisory Committees?").
235. Erie R.R_ Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see Walker v. Armco Steel Co., 446 U.S.
740 (1980); Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse
Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); see also Carrington,
"Substance" and "Procedure," supra note 1, at 284-88, 293-99 (discussing Erie and Rules Enabling

Act meanings of terms "substance" and "procedure"). But see Burbank, supra note I (disputing

Professor Carrington's analysis of the substance-procedure distinction derived from this line of
cases).
236. See supra text accompanying note 190; see also Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure,"
supra note 1 (observing that the Rules Enabling Act does not give a court the ability to override
political decisions made by Congress).
237. See Hazard, supra note 17, at 1289.
238. See Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure," supra note 1, at 284-85, 326-27 (describing
the principle of "variable meaning" as applied to characterizations of substance and procedure).
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239

The second point concerns the philosophy underlying the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Here the traditionalists adhere to a notion of procedural rules

as formulated in 1938 with a history traceable to Pound, Field, Brougham, and
Bentham. 240 This is a vision of the rules as trans-substantive, guided by principles of generality, flexibility, simplicity, forgiveness, coherence, and judicial professionalism. 241 These core values, in turn, require an apolitical rulemaking

process to ensure that rule amendments do not compromise the primary principles of trans-substantiality, generality, and flexibility. For the traditionalists, a
politicized rulemaking process that results in rules accommodating partisan in-

terests hopelessly compromises the central vision of the rules. Essentially, the
disagreement between the participatory advocates and the traditionalists involves whether the trans-substantive vision of the rules has any continuing vitality or claim to legitimacy. The participatory advocates say no;242 the
traditionalists say yes.243
The third characteristic of the judicial rulemaking model is a fear of applying congressional branch legislative processes to procedural rulemaking. Simply
stated, the traditionalists do not want their procedural rules drafted by congressional subcommittee lawyers, nor do they wish Advisory Committee efforts to
resemble that legislative process. 244 This repugnance stems from a view of the
congressional legislative process as one mired in partisan lobbying, constituent
influence-peddling, log-rolling, porkbarrel, and compromise. To cede procedural rulemaking to Congress or to introduce politics into the Advisory Com245
mittee process threatens the original rule reform movement of the 1930s.
239. See id. at 282, 301-02, 304, 308, 311, 313, 315-16, 321, 323, 325 (arguing against politicization of the procedural rulemaking process and describing examples).
240. Id. at 299-300.
241. Id. at 299-307 (defining these characteristics).
242. See Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, FederalRules and Common
Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. Rxv. 693 (1988); Resnik, FailingFaith."Adjudicatory Procedurein Decline, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 494, 544-51 (1986).
243. See Carrington, Making Rules, supra note 1, at 2069. According to Professor Carrington:

Critical analysis of the existing process shows that it is ill-suited to resolving political contests between competing groups who seek at the expense of their adversaries to advance
their short-term interests in litigation outcomes. Process is therefore not competent to
make rules intended to give particular advantage to, say, plaintiffs against antitrust defend-

ants or vice versa.
Id.; see also Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure," supra note 1, at 300-10, 322-27.
244. See Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure," supra note 1, at 323 (inveighing against partisanship in the procedural rulemaking process); Hazard, supranote 17, at 1293-94 (noting that even
many critics of the judicial rulemaking process, including Judge Weinstein and Professor Lesnick,
are reluctant to endorse congressional promulgation of procedural rules).
245. See Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure," supra note 1, at 301. Professor Carrington

writes:
What reformers such as Pound had in mind was the depoliticization of judicial procedure.
On the basis of experiences in England and the United States, they feared and expected
that groups of prospective litigants seeking short-term advantage through the legislature
would neutralize the long-term effectiveness of judicial institutions and subject them to
close oversight by the legislature. The reformers had observed that neutralization is associated with the numbing complexity and rigidity of procedural law produced by a democratic pursuit of short-term interests in matters of judicial procedure.
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Politicization of the rulemaking process reintroduces values antithetical to the

goals of trans-substantive rules of general applicability.2 4 6 Thus, in discussing
the Rules Enabling Act's requirement of reporting to Congress, the current Advisory Committee Reporter signals this concern:
Reporting is not necessary to protect substantive rights established by
Congress, for these cannot be abridged, enlarged, or modified. Nor is
it likely that Congress intended the reporting process to be an invitation to itself to consider anew even the most technocratic and apolitical
provisions of any reported amendments. Unconstrained review by
Congress of rule promulgations, with the substitution of congressional
judgment for that of the Court, would re-politicize the rules, defeat the
neutrality goals of the reform movement, fragment the rules, increase
complexity, elevate cost, diminish the stature of the judiciary, and decrease the effectiveness of law enforcement, all without material compensating benefits. 24 7
Critics of participatory rulemaking make two additional points. The first is
that participatory proponents idealize the legislative process while disregarding
uncomfortable realities, or the "bad part[s] of legislative democracy.1 248 The
second is that participatory proponents tend to idealize the product of that process, while the traditionalists do not.249 Therefore, admirers of participatory
rulemaking are unable to accept "that a quite undemocratic legislative process
has proven capable of producing a very satisfactory product. Correlatively, the
archetype of institutionalized democracy-the legislature-has mishandled the
' ' 50
same work when it has gotten into it. 2
3.

Mediating the Models

These two rulemaking models are difficult to reconcile into one workable
model. Participatory advocates reject the trans-substantive philosophy of procedural rules, a perspective that dictates litigation-specific revisions and partisan
participation to inform that result. On the contrary, traditionalists hold paramount the principles of trans-substantive rules, a belief that compels an apolitical process conducted by expert elites operating with relative immunity from
partisan pressures. The participatory advocates believe that there are no such
things as neutral rules; the traditionalists believe that neutral rules are the central accomplishment of judicial rulemaking. The open-process proponents be246. The current Reporter for the Advisory Committee believes that the Rules Enabling Act was
designed specifically to be "anti-democratic." See id. The Reporter stated:
The Rules Enabling Act was avowedly antidemocratic in the sense that it withdrew
"procedural" law-making from the political arena and made it the activity of professional
technicians. The politically responsive organs of government, the legislative and executive

branches, were substantially excluded from participation in the process created by the Act,
as were those familiar and important influences now often known (perhaps unjustly) by the
opprobrium "special interest groups."

Id.
247. Id. at 323.
248. Hazard, supra note 17, at 1294.
249. See id.
250. Id.
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lieve that the substance-procedure distinction is illusory and that there are no
purely procedural rules. The traditionalists contend that while locating the
boundary of the substance-procedure divide is sometimes difficult, there are genuinely procedural rules. The participatory advocates contend that the product
of fully legislated rules is better and fairer; the judicial rulemakers believe the
product is worse. The participatory proponents ask, "what could possibly be
wrong with opening the rulemaking process and letting everyone interested have
a say?" and the traditionalists respond, "a lot."
There is, of course, no resolution to the debate concerning the underlying
philosophy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and whether that philosophy is wrong and unfair. Similarly, there can be no intelligent resolution of the
substance-procedure debate, which will continue to hold unending fascination as
a parlor-game for academicians. Much of the discussion regarding the rulemaking process has focused on these lofty but unresolvable theoretical issues, in the
misguided notion that proper rulemaking application will flow logically from
clarifying a victory in the theoretical debate. There is something surreal about
these discussions.
As a practical matter, the only interesting debate is whether legislated procedural rules are in any sense better than judicially promulgated ones. Are the
procedural rules that Congress enacts better than those drafted by judicial committees? Does "institutionalized democracy" provide a "more satisfactory product"? Surely these are questions that cannot be answered without agreement as
to what constitutes good procedural rules, an inquiry destined to reintroduce the
trans-substantive debate. But something can be said, at least, about the effects of
rules legislated in different forums.
D. LegislatingProceduralRules
Congress and the judicial committee structure draft and promulgate procedural rules, so there is experience with procedural rulemaking in both these different branches.251 In both forums, the rulemakers recently encountered
lobbying efforts focused on proposed rule revisions. The following sections describe the results of these efforts. The argument is that this lobbying is highly
effective to achieve rule modification, but the difficult question is whether the
end product is laudable.
251. An interesting contrast is provided by executive branch or administrative rulemaking,
where partisan advocacy is the norm. There is ample literature describing how, and to what extent,
executive branch agencies become captive of the industries they regulate. See, eg., INTEREsT
GROUP POLrrics (A. Cigler & B. Loomis eds. 1986); K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED
INTERESTS AND AMERIcAN DEMOCRACY 330-57 (1986); Gais, Peterson, & Walker, Interest Groups,
Iron TrianglesandRepresentative Institutionsin American National Government, 14 BRrr. J. OF POL.
Sci. 161 (1984); Salisbury, InterestRepresentation: The Dominance of Institutions,78 AM. POL. ScI.
REv. 64 (1984). Although administratively promulgated rules are entitled to a strong presumption
of validity, see Hazard, supra note 17, at 1290, they are still subject to judicial review. See Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure," supra note 1, at 303-04.
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1. Promulgating Procedural Rules in the Legislative Branch: Of ProcessServers, Psychologists, and the Public Interest Bar
Three recent examples of congressional rule revision illustrate different aspects of procedural rulemaking in that forum. The first, notorious instance is
the 1983 revision of rule 4 concerning service of process.2 5 2 It demonstrates
how Congress can make a rule worse through its legislative efforts. The second
concerns the unnoticed, unheralded addition to rule 35 of a special provision
allowing psychologists to conduct mental examinations as part of civil litigation
discovery. 25 3 That experience demonstrates how Congress permits legislative
enactment by stealth and the potential for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to become a patchwork of partisan porkbarrel. The third illustration is the successful public-interest lobbying in Congress that caused the Advisory Committee
to abandon a revision of rule 68.254 This effort demonstrates that running interference in Congress can induce the Advisory Committee to abandon its own rule
revision endeavors.
(a) Rule 4 Revision
The extensively documented legislative history of the rule 4 amendments 2 55
suggests the misadventures of congressional forays into procedural rule revision.
The 1983 amendments to rule 4 represented the first instance in which a procedural rule revision worked its way through the entire judicial branch rulemaking
252. The best history of this legislative process is Sinclair, Service of Process Rethinking the
Theory and ProcedureofSering Process Under FederalRule 4(c), 73 VA.L. REv. 1183, 1197-1212
(1987). See also Carrington, Continuing Work on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63 NoTaE DAME
L. REV. 733, 734-42 (1988) (describing problems with amended rule 4 and delineating proposals for
further revision of rule 4 to correct these problems); Mullenix, The New FederalExpress: Mail
Service ofProcess Under Amended Rule 4,4 REv. oF LrrIG. 299, 300-37 (1985) (discussing amended
rule 4 and surveying case law under rule changes); Siegel, Practice Commentary on Amendment of
FederalRule 4 with SpecialStatute ofLimitationsPrecautions, 96 F.R.D. 88, 97-115 (1983) (discussing statute of limitations pitfalls and suggesting solutions); Whitten, Separation of Powers Restrictions on JudicialRulemaking: A Case Study ofFederalRule 4, 40 ME. L. REv. 41, 70-103 (1988)
(discussing rulemaking authority of Congress and the third branch, with particular reference to rule
4); Note, Rule 4: Service by MailMay Cost You More Than a Stamp, 61 IND. L.J. 217, 224-39 (1986)
(surveying problems under amended rule 4).
253. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35(a), order for examination, states:
When the mental or physical condition (including the blood group) of a party, or of a
person in the custody or under the legal control of a party, is in controversy, the court in
which the action is pending may order the party to submit to a physical examination by a
physician, or a mental examination by a physician or psychologist or to produce for examination the person in the party's custody or legal control.
FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a).
After the Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules to the 1970 and 1980 amendments, an
"Editorial Note" indicates that the word "psychologist" was inserted after "physician" as a result of
section 7047(b)(2) of Public Law 100-690. FED. R. Civ. P. 35 advisory committee's note. This
editorial note also indicates that the legislative change failed to add "or psychologist's" after "physician's." Id.
254. See Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure," supra note 1, at 283-84 (discussing failed
effort to amend rule 68 in Advisory Committee and abandonment of that effort as a result of intense
lobbying by the public interest bar). See generally Burbank, Proposalsto Amend Rule 68--Time to
Abandon Ship, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 425, 434-40 (1986) (urging the Advisory Committee to cease
efforts to amend rule 68); Simon, The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1, 10-19 (1985)
(describing simultaneous efforts of the Advisory Committee and congressional bills to revise rule 68).
255. See Sinclair, supra note 252, at 1194-1212.
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apparatus and gained the approval of the Supreme Court, only to be reworked
into new legislation by the Congress. 25 6 The impetus for amending rule 4 was
an effort, beginning in 1978, to eliminate the role of the United States Marshal's
Service in process-serving. 257 The judicial branch committees proposed revisions centering on a mail service system. 258 When Congress received the judicial
branch proposals in 1982, it enacted legislation postponing the effective date of
the rule 4 amendments until October 1983, "apparently in response to lobbying
efforts by various groups that asserted defects in the Supreme Court's
' '259
proposal[s].
26°
At this juncture, in response to criticisms of the judicial rule 4 proposals,
Congress tried its hand at procedural rulemaking. A congressional subcommittee drafted its bill on service of process in November 1982 without the benefit of
any hearings. 26 1 In December 1982 the subcommittee presented the bill to the
House of Representatives and, without debate, it became law in February
1983.262 Thus, Congress accomplished in four months the rule 4 revision that
had taken four years in the judicial branch's deliberative processes. The subcommittee lawyers adopted a California model of service, reduced the role of
federal marshals, broadened the category of persons who could serve process,
and established mail service with time limits. 2 63 Except for the reduced marshal's role, the congressionally drafted provisions all subsequently proved problematic, 264 causing the Advisory Committee to revisit and redraft rule 4 in 198990.
What lessons are to be learned from the rule 4 congressional drafting experience? One lesson, to be sure, concerns the time pressures on congressional
subcommittee staff to draft something in response to constituent demands.
Thus, a historian of the rule 4 legislative saga commented:
256. Id. at 1198-1212.
257. Id. at 1198.
258. Id. at 1198-1207. Professor Sinclair lists the central features of the rule 4 revisions approved by the Supreme Court in 1982 and transmitted to Congress: (1) service by any nonparty

adult; (2) limited service of summonses and complaints by marshals to in forma pauperis suits,
seamen's suits, cases in which service by a marshal was authorized specifically by a statute, and cases
where the court found service of process by a marshal necessary; (3) marshal service of other forms
of process; (4) plaintiff responsibility for arranging service; (5) authorized service by registered or
certified mail; (6) mail service as the basis for default judgment; (7) and a requirement of service of
process within 120 days after the filing of the complaint. Id. at 1207.
259. Id. at 1207-08.
260. Id. at 1208-09. The judicial branch proposals were criticized for providing flawed mail
service, for depriving litigants of effective local service procedures, and for confusion concerning
time limitations. Id. at 1209.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1209-10.
263. Id. at 1211-12.
264. Id. at 1212-88; see also authorities cited supra note 252. The need for further clarifying
amendments to rule 4 prompted the Advisory Committee to revisit the rule during 1989-90, with
amendments in final proposal form now transmitted to the Standing Committee on Civil Rules. See
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the FederalRules of Appellate Procedure and the
FederalRules of Civil Procedure,Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the United States
Judicial Conference (Sept. 1989); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 4 (Proposed Draft Mar. 15, 1990)
(summons).
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In the rush to find a substitute for the original draft of amendments to Rule 4's basic service of process provisions and to relieve the
Marshals Service of its financial strain, Congress concocted a new rule
hurriedly. The need for simplicity, combined with the concern that
any effort to deal with thorny practical issues could have prevented
enactment of any law, may
have led to passage of a bill known to be
265
pregnant with difficulties.
Time pressure often induces Congress to act quickly, affecting the deliberative
process negatively. Although the subcommittee initially set October 1983 as its
own deadline for considering congressionally initiated legislation,
[p]ressure mounted, however, well before that point, as the Justice Department and the Judicial Conference of the United States urged Congress to act quickly to eliminate the stresses that were bankrupting the
Marshals Service. The bill that eventually passed was not subject to
hearings, and the report prepared was so rushed that it is unnumbered,
having simply been read into the Congressional
Record when Con26 6
gress, without debate, enacted the law.
The second lesson of the rule 4 experience is that the legislation must be
politically acceptable to congressional members. This ensures that "thorny practical issues" will not delay or frustrate enactment, reducing legislation to a leastcommon-denominator variety:
Congressional staff charged at the time with overseeing the drafting of
a new bill felt that the Justice Department did not have an agenda of
substantive goals for the new legislation other than the singular focus
on reducing the financial strains on the Marshals Service.... Moreover, the prevailing perception was that the more the draft rule attempted to address the specific operations of service, the greater the
likelihood that someone in the Congress could object; hence, whereas
several mechanical issues were thought to exist, none was addressed in
267
the text of the rule.
Thus, in attempting to sidestep potential objections, the congressional legislation
created its own difficulties. Although it is debatable whether the judicial branch

rule 4 proposals would have fared better, the congressional attempt at rulemaking generally is recognized as creating more problems than it remedied. The fact
that the Advisory Committee again has had to rework rule 4 signals caution
about congressionally enacted rule reforms.
(b)

Rule 35 Revision

If the rule 4 experience suggests the dangers of hastily prepared rule revision, then the congressional amendment to rule 35 tells an equally interesting
tale about constituent politics in Washington. Rule 35 is the federal rule governing physical and mental exams as part of civil litigation discovery. The rule
authorizes a court to order the examination of a person when that person's phys265. Sinclair, supra note 252, at 1288 (citations omitted).
266. Id. at 1288 n.605.
267. Id. at n.606.
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ical or mental condition is in controversy. 268 The rule has been amended once
in fifty-five years; it now requires that parties make available persons in their
custody for examination and that they exchange medical reports.2 69
In 1988, however, Congress enacted a small language change in rule 35(a)
to add the term "psychologist" to "physician" as a person who may conduct a

mental examination.27 0 This change was inserted by one Senator at the request
of a legislative aide,27 1 as a rider to a criminal drug enforcement bill.272

The

purpose and effect of this addition was to broaden the category of persons who
might conduct mental examinations as part of civil litigation discovery, because
psychologists generally are not trained and certified "physicians" under the rule.
The legislative rider represented a private bill on behalf of psychologists who
now are eligible under the federal rules to perform this service,-. This rule

change, accomplished simply by gaining the willing ear of a legislative aide, economically benefits a particular constituent group with only a peripheral interest
in civil litigation.
The question is whether any harm was done, apart from circumventing the
judicial rulemaking process and undercutting the authority of those rulemaking
bodies. Two points are worth consideration. First, the addition of these examiners inadvertently gave rise to questions concerning the definition of a "psychologist" and who is qualified to perform a mental examination under the rule.

Whereas the term "physician" in the rule means a medically trained, certified
examiner, standards governing qualifications of psychologists vary from state to
state. This issue caused the Advisory Committee to place rule 35 on its 1989-90
agenda and propose qualifying language to address the problem of psychologists'
credentials. 273 The discussion of this issue at the June 1990 Advisory Commit-

tee meeting suggested the difficulties in conforming congressionally enacted language to existing rule requirements.

274

268. FED. R. Civ. P. 35; see supra note 253.
269. See FED. R. Civ. P. 35 (1970 amendment). The rule was also amended in 1987, but the
notes to the rule indicate that these amendments were technical and not intended as substantive
changes. See id. (1987 amendment).
Rule 35 gave rise to perhaps the most famous case construing the validity of the federal rules of
civil procedure. See Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941); see also Burbank, supra note 254, at 432433 (1986) (discussing Sibbach and the substance-procedure distinction).
270. See supra note 253.
271. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE TO THE

CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES (Sept. 1987) (indicating that the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules at its June 1987 meeting had "decided to go forward with Senator Inouye's proposal to
amend Rule 35 to permit medical examinations to be conducted by psychologists as well as physicians," but Congress enacted its own change before the Advisory Committee was able to act). The
legislative aide subsequently received a commendation from the American Psychologist Association.
See also Carrington, Making Rules, supra note 1, at 2123-24 (noting that the rule 35 rider was the
only time in fifty years Congress acted on its own to modify a rule of civil procedure).
272. See Senate Amendment to H.R. 5210, Omnibus DrugInitiativeAct of 1988, with an Amendment, 134 CONG. REC. H11108-01 at 551 (October 21, 1988) (adding section 7047). Section 7047(b)
was a conforming amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 to make it parallel to the
provision in the criminal code to utilize psychologists. See 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b) (1988); see also
Massey v. Manitowoc Co., 101 F.R.D. 304 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (permitting licensed psychologist to
administer tests under rule 35).
273. See FED. R. Civ. P. 35 (Proposed Draft Mar. 18, 1990).
274. The Advisory Committee members ultimately abandoned an attempt to impose credentials
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The second point concerns the process by which the rule 35 addition was
accomplished. Although Congress enacted the rule 4 amendments with undue
haste, those revisions had been percolating through the rulemaking system for
some time before Congress intervened with its own legislation. Congressional
action in that instance was preceded by four years of debate on service reform.
In contrast, the rule 35 addition was accomplished by stealth-without notice,
comment, hearings, or a record. No one inquired whether the rule change was
necessary. The mechanism for accomplishing the end, a legislative rider, suggests that the addition was partisan porkbarrel unlikely to survive on its merits
as legislative rule reform. The lesson of the rule 35 amendment is that lobbyists
can, as the current Reporter would characterize this process, decorate the federal rules with special interest concerns. 275 This, consequently, leaves the Advisory Committee in the difficult position of having to defer to Congress while
trying to make wholecloth out of the federal rules.
(c) Attempted Rule 68 Revision
The experience of the attempted revision of rule 68 illustrates yet another

dimension of the politics of rule reform. The rule 68 experience demonstrates
how concerted efforts by partisans can cause the Advisory Committee to abandon a rule amendment altogether. This case suggests that when partisan interests fail to persuade the Advisory Committee of the ill-wisdom of proposed
actions, sabre-rattling in Congress effectively will induce the Advisory Committee's retreat.
Rule 68, the "offer of judgment" rule, provides that a defendant (at least ten
days before trial) can offer to settle a case with a plaintiff and if the plaintiff
accepts, the court enters a judgment. If the plaintiff rejects the offer and goes to
trial and wins a judgment less than the offer, then the plaintiff has to pay the
costs incurred after the defendant made the offer. 276 Because of perceived
qualifications for psychologists, partly in recognition of the current loose standards for qualifying
expert witnesses under the rules of evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (standard is if "scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify"). There also was discussion to the effect that the court orders an examination under rule 35, but the court is not generally in the business of assessing the credentials of the
examiner chosen by the parties to conduct an examination. Discussion of Proposed Amendments to
Rule 35 (June 8, 1990) (meeting of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules).
275. See Carrington, Making Rules, supra note 1, at 2074-79; Carrington, "Substance" and
"Procedure," supra note 1, at 282-84.
276. See FED. R. Civ. P. 68. This "Offer of Judgment" rule provides:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against a
claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against the
defending party for the money or property or to the effect specified in the offer, with costs
then accrued. If within 10 days after the service of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of
acceptance together with proof of service thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the
offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the
making of the offer. The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a
subsequent offer ....
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problems with rule 68,277 the rule became part of the Advisory (Committee's
agenda for 1983 revisions.
In its first round of revisions, the Advisory Committee encountered severe
criticism concerning its rule 68 efforts, and withdrew its initial attempts at
changing the rule. 278 The Advisory Committee then regrouped and proposed
new revisions designed to "put teeth into" rule 68.279 These 1984 proposals
again engendered considerable disfavor from advocacy groups, particularly the
plaintiffs' public interest bar, which viewed the proposed changes as an attempt
to override attorneys' fee provisions in various civil rights statutes. 2 0 Further
exacerbating the situation, the Supreme Court held in Marek v. Chesny2 a1 that a
civil rights plaintiff who rejected a settlement offer and then failed to recover a
more favorable judgment at trial could not recover attorneys' fees for work done
28 2
after the offer.
The Court's decision in Marek was riddled with political implications because of the concurrent endeavors of the Advisory Committee and Congress to
amend rule 68.283 With insight into events that would unfold during the next
three years, one commentator observed:
The ACLU filed an amicus brief on behalf of the losing side in
Marek. Several opponents of the 1984 proposal also scored the district
judge in Marek for denying post-offer attorneys' fees to the plaintiff
even though the judge himself had considered the proper settlement
Id.
277. The rule was criticized as ineffective for two reasons. First, since most recovery of "costs"
excluded attorneys' fees, such recoveries under the rule tended to be nominal and not conducive to
invoking the rule. Second, the rule provides for recovery only if the defendant makes an offer and
the plaintiff fails to recover the offered amount; the rule does not provide for recovery in the situation
in which a plaintiff makes an offer. See Burbank, supra note 254, at 425 n.3; Simon, supra note 254,

at 6-7.
278. See Burbank, supra note 1, at 1037-39; Burbank, supra note 254, at 426; Carrington, Making Rules, supra note 1, at 2078-79; Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" supra note 1, at 28384; Simon, supra note 254, at 10-16 (detailing history of rule 68 proposals in the Advisory Committee and reactions from constituent groups to those proposals); Tobias, supra note 22, at 310-19.
279. See Burbank, supra note 254, at 426 (citing a background memorandum to the Advisory
Committee written by the then Chairman and Reporter of the Advisory Committee).
280. See generally Burbank, supra note 254, at 435-40 (discussing various reactions to proposed
amendments to rule 68); Carrington, Making Rules, supra note 1, at 2078 ("The concern of the civil
rights bar, whether expressed through Congress or directly to members of the Civil Rules Committee, the Standing Committee, or the Judicial Conference, was sufficient to cause the rulemakers to
abandon the subject of Rule 68.") (footnotes omitted); Silverstein & Rosenblatt, A Square Peg in a
Round Hole: The Application of Rule 68 to Awards of Attorney's Fees in Civil Rights Litigation, 16
CoNN.L. REv.949 (1984) (urging that the Rules Enabling Act precludes fee-shifting to encourage
settlement in certain types of litigation); Simon, Rule 68 at the Crossroad" The RelationshipBetween
Offers ofJudgment andStatutoryAttorney's Fees, 53 U. CIN. L. REv. 889 (1984) (arguing in favor of
defining rule 68 costs to include civil rights attorneys' fees); Simon, supra note 254, at 17-19 (discussing reaction to the 1984 proposals); Note, The Conflict Between Rule 68 and the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Statute: Reinterpretingthe Rules EnablingAct, 98 HAZv. L. RV. 828 (1985) (stressing
the priority of the substantive rights embodied in the civil rights statutes).
281. 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
282. Id. at 5-12; see also Simon, supranote 254, at 19-24 (discussing the implications of Marek).
283. Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, chastised the majority for meddling in rule 68
construction, arguing that "Congress and the Judicial Conference are far more institutionally competent... to resolve th[e] matter." Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 42 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
see Simon, supra note 254, at 22-23.
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range to be well above the amount of the defendant's Rule 68 offer....
These groups may well now lobby Congress to change Rule 68 without
waiting for the Advisory Committee and Judicial Conference to act, or
to amend section 1988 and other fee-shifting statutes to make clear

that attorneys' fees are not considered "costs" for purposes of rule
68.284

The political fallout from the attempted rule 68 revisions, coupled with
Marek, bears interesting lessons. Congress did indeed become the forum of
choice for opponents of the proposed Advisory Committee revisions because

they accurately perceived Congress as the more hospitable forum in which to
lobby for the plaintiffs' public interest concerns. 28 5 In response to efforts of the
Advisory Committee and the invitation from the Supreme Court to revisit rule

68, legislation subsequently was introduced in Congress to modify rule 68.286
The parties opposed to rule 68 revision learned other lessons from this experience as well. In large measure, the rule 68 experience precipitated the movement to repeal the supersession clause, with the same parties who opposed rule
68 modification now aligned to urge repeal of the supersession clause.287 The
supersession clause of the Rules Enabling Act states that any new, properly
promulgated federal rule "supersedes" any existing contradictory rule. 288 The

theory was that if the Advisory Committee persisted in its attempts to modify
rule 68 to the disadvantage of certain litigants, then that rule change should not
be permitted to supersede existing substantive legislation permitting recovery of

attorneys' fees.2 89 The rule 68 controversy also led to increased agitation for a

more open rulemaking process, evidenced by testimony concerning amendment
of the Rules Enabling Act as part of the 1988 Judicial Reform legislative package. 29 ° Perhaps the biggest lesson of the rule 68 experience was that if partisans
284. Simon, supra note 254, at 23 n.138 (citations omitted). In addition to the ACLU, Professor
Simon also identified as opponents to the 1984 Advisory Committee proposals the Alliance for Justice, and Professors Resnik and Macklin, who appeared and gave testimony at hearings on the proposed rule changes. See id. Some of these same groups and persons subsequently would reappear
during congressional consideration of the 1988 Judicial Improvements Act to lobby for amendment
of the Rules Enabling Act to open access to the judicial rulemaking process, to repeal the supersession clause of the Rules Enabling Act, to lobby the Advisory Committee for amendment of rule 11,
and now to oppose the proposed informal discovery rule.
285. See Simon, supranote 254, at 24 n.142 (discussing legislation introduced in Congress subsequent to Marek); Burbank, supra note 254, at 440 n.81 (same); Carrington, Making Rules, supra
note 1, at 2078 n.59 (same).
286. H.R. 3998, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
287. See Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure,"supra note I, at 283; Burbank, supra note 1,
at 1036-39.
288. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988).
289. See Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure," supra note 1, at 283. As Professor Car-

rington observed:
Some proposed provisions were criticized as being inconsistent with the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, and perhaps they were. Some imagined that the
rulemakers might nevertheless promulgate such a Rule [68] in order to supersede the 1976
Act, and thus use the provisions of the Rules Enabling Act to thwart the will of Congress.
Id.; see also Tobias, supra note 22, at 312-19 (discussing the history of rule 68).
290. See CourtReform andAccess to Justice.4ct: Hearings on H.R. 3152 (PartII), supra note 18

(letters from academicians and practicing lawyers advocating either repeal or retention of the supersession clause of the Rules Enabling Act).
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are able to generate enough political heat, the Advisory Committee will desist
from rulemaking altogether, which is precisely what happened wilh the Committee's rule 68 efforts. 291 Although some view these events as a democratic
triumph of substance over procedure, others perceive the outcome as a victory
for the decibel-raising school of interest group rulemaking. Whatever the perception, the reality was a retreat of the Advisory Committee in the face of concerted, noisy partisan politics.
2.

Promulgating Procedural Rules in the Judicial Branch: Of Court
Reporters and Rule 11

It should not be surprising that partisan politics informs legislative
rulemaking, but more curious is the incursion of such partisan tactics into the
inner workings ofjudicial rulemaking. Two recent illustrations suggest incipient

problems with this developing phenomenon, one relating to interest group lobbying on behalf of court reporters, and the other regarding public interest bar
lobbying on behalf of rule 11 revisions.
After the experience of the process-servers on behalf of rule 4 reform, it was
perhaps inevitable that the organized fraternity of court reporters would appear
before the Advisory Committee in 1990 to lobby for revision of rule 30292 relating to oral depositions. The Advisory Committee now seemed prepared for the
bread-and-butter issue inherent in this rule reform. The court reporters' concern
centered on a proposed revision that would permit mechanically recorded depositions (including videotaped depositions) to replace the usual practice of stenographically recorded and transcribed depositions. 293 This put the court
reporters in the awkward position of arguing against the advantages of modem
technology. 294 The discomfort raised by the court reporters' concerns was sufficient to induce the Advisory Committee to defer consideration of immediate
reform of rule 30.295 Rule 30 revision has not been defeated, but it has been
delayed.
291. See Carrington, Making Rules, supra note 1, at 2078-79. Professor Carrington viewed the
rule 68 experience as an illustration of the incursion of partisan politics into the rulemaking process:
"Rulemaking in this [neutral] tradition must avoid the interest group politics that is the meat and

drink of the parliaments of the world. The controversy over proposed amendments to Rule 68
recently illustrated this tenderness of rulemaking." Id. It is difficult to evade the conclusion that the
rule 68 experience caused Advisory Committee Reporter Carrington to formulate his "decibel" test
for rulemaking authority. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
292. A representative of the Court Reporters' Association appeared before the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, June 8, 1990, to speak against any revision of rule 30 that would modify
requirements for written transcripts in the taking of depositions. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30. The
author was present at this meeting.
293. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(4) currently permits taking depositions by other than
stenographic means upon stipulation of the parties. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4). The proposed rule
revision would make this exception the normal practice. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (Proposed Draft
Mar. 18, 1990) (discussed at June 8, 1990 meeting of the Advisory Committee).
294. To the amusement of some present, the court reporters' arguments were given some small
support when, subsequent to their presentation, the tape machine recording the Advisory Committee

meeting stopped and failed to record a portion of the proceedings.
295. This agreement to defer action on rule 30 revisions occurred at the Advisory Committee
meeting of June 8th, 1990.
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Should anyone be concerned by the court reporters' appearance before the
Advisory Committee and their lobbying for economic self-interest? Probably
not. But their appearance was enough to cause speculation that any potential
Advisory Committee action on rule 30 might cause the court reporters to take
their case to Congress, with the result that Congress would act to protect the

court reporters' interest. Certainly there is now precedent for process-servers
and psychologists gaining self-serving porkbarrel legislation through Congress, a

lesson surely not lost on the court reporters. Thus the issue lurking in incipient
rule 30 revision is not one of impartial procedural reform, but rather one of who

is going to make the decisions about the appropriateness or desirability of this
reform.

The lesson of the court reporters is one of pure interest-group politics.
While academicians play legitimate hand-wringing theoretical games with the

substance-procedure distinction applied to rule 4,296 it is difficult to suggest that
the form of taking a deposition is anything other than a procedural matter. This
is as crystalline an example of a Hanna housekeeping rule as the rulemakers are

ever likely to encounter.2 97 As a purely procedural matter, this should be exclusively in the province of the Advisory Committee, which should be able to resolve procedural reform issues without siege from interest-group petitions.
Should the Advisory Committee now retreat from rule reform in this instance
because of the decibel level? Do the court reporters, the process-servers, and the

psychologists now have the opportunity to dictate rule reform by the strength of
their claims and the level of their clamor?

The case of the court reporters, however, is minor compared to legislative
lobbying efforts underway to influence further revision of rule 11 on attorney
sanctions. 298 As part of the 1983 package of rule reforms, rule 11 was amended
296. See, eg., Carrington, Continuing Work on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63 NomaR
DAME L. REv. 733, 744-46 (1987) (rulemaking authority for modifying rule 4); Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure," supra note 1, at 319-21 (concluding that service of process provision is a
valid exercise of rulemaking power conferred by the Rules Enabling Act); Burbank, supra note 1, at
1024-26, 1041 (challenging Carrington's characterizations of rulemaking authority relating to rule

4).

297. This is not to suggest that there are not people who can make the argument, however. In
the instance of depositions, one might argue, for example, that the failure of mechanical recording
devices denies litigants a written record of testimony and is a potential denial of due process.
298. See FED. R. Civ. P. I1. This rule states, in pertinent part:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, whose address
shall be stated.... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the
signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation.
Id. Rule 11 also authorizes the imposition of sanctions for violation of the rule:
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the
other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing
of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
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because the Advisory Committee had concluded that the rule had not been effective in deterring various litigation abuses.299 In the words of the Advisory Committee, "[tihe amended rule attempts to deal with the problem by building upon
and expanding the equitable doctrine permitting the court to award expenses,
including attorney's fees, to a litigant whose opponent acts in bad faith in instituting or conducting litigation. ' '3° ° The centerpiece of the amended rule was a
test of "reasonableness under the circumstances" with regard to the lawyer's
efforts in conducting some pretrial inquiry into the facts and law underlying the
30
allegations of a filing.

If the purpose of amending rule 11 was to put teeth into the rule, the Advisory Committee achieved its goal. Since 1983, court interpretation of amended
rule 11 has generated hundreds of sanctions, 302 as well as hundreds of district
and appellate court opinions construing the amended rule. 3 0 3 Despite a specific
statement from the Advisory Committee that it did not intend rule 11 "to chill
3 °4
an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories,"
the rule 11 amendments have come under increased attack as causing that very
chilling effect on certain classes of litigants, particularly civil-rights plaintiffs and

public-interest litigants.30 5 In response to perceived widespread dissatisfaction
with the rule 11 amendments, the Advisory Committee in 1988 decided to revisit
the rule.
The initial clamor over rule 11 coincided with discontent over the Advisory
Committee's efforts to amend rule 68. This combination of rule revisions was
perceived in some quarters as an effort to impede prosecution of certain classes
of disfavored claims. 3° 6 This perception, in turn, fueled the lobbying efforts of
Id.
299. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 notes of the advisory committee on rules, 1983 amendment; S.
KAssIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS 2-4 (1985).

300. FED. R.Civ. P. 11 notes of the advisory committee on rules, 1983 amendment.
301. Id. The advisory note states:
The new language stresses the need for some prefiling inquiry into both the facts and the
law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the rule. The standard is one of reasonableness under the circumstances.... This standard is more stringent than the general goodfaith formula and thus it is expected that a greater range of circumstances will trigger its
violation.
Id. (citations omitted).
302. See Tobias, supra note 22, at 301 ("Attorneys' vigorous use of rule 11 and its compulsory
nature have already led to approximately 1,000 opinions (and to thousands more that have not been
reported) under the amendment."); authorities cited supra note 151.
303. During the 1989-90 Term, the Supreme Court for the first time decided two cases construing amended rule 11. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S.Ct. 2447 (1990) (district court
retains jurisdiction to impose rule 11 sanctions even after voluntary dismissal under rule 41(a); appropriate standard on review of sanctions is abuse of discretion standard; and Appellate Rule of
Procedure 38, rather than rule 11, applies to possible sanctions for appealing rule 11 sanction);
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 110 S.Ct. 456 (1989) (attorney rather than law
firm is personally responsible under rule 11 signature requirements for violations of the rule); see also
Coyle, Rule 11 Imbroglio Rages On, 12 Nat'l L.J., June 25, 1990, at 27 (discussing the impact of
Pavelic and Cooter). During the 1990-91 Term, the Supreme Court held that the same rule 11 standards applied to parties (clients), as well. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications
Enters., Inc., No. 89-1500, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 1297 (Feb. 26, 1991).
304. See FED. .CIV. P. 11 notes of the advisory committee on rules, 1983 amendment.
305. See supra note 151.
306. See Tobias, supra note 22, at 301-17.
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the public interest bar in Congress to undo the Advisory Committee's work on
rule 68, to repeal the supersession clause, and to open Advisory Committee process. These lobbying efforts succeeded in defeating rule 68 revision and in expanding Advisory Committee process, but not in repealing the supersession
clause. 30 7 And in all these efforts, the same interested groups appeared to lobby
308
for their interests.
At the fall 1989 Advisory Committee meeting, at least three significant
events occurred. First, the Reporter asked the Advisory Committee for guidance about conduct of the Advisory Committee under the new openness mandate of the 1988 Judicial Improvements Act.30 9 Second, interest-group
representatives appeared before the Committee to urge modifications of Committee procedure under the new openness mandate. 310 And third, these same
representatives gave testimony about the need for rule 11 revision, calling for
further empirical study of the rule's impact on classes of litigants. Thus, at the
very same time the Committee was grappling self-consciously with the implications of its new openness, it simultaneously was experiencing the reality of its
new politics of rulemaking.
One result of the November 1989 Advisory Committee meeting was a directive from the Committee for further empirical study of rule 11.311 Not only did
the Advisory Committee request that the Federal Judicial Center conduct further empirical study of rule 11 practice, including its impact on types of cases
and litigants, but the Committee invited interest-group representatives to conduct their own empirical studies to educate the Committee concerning operation
of the amended rule.312 Further deliberation of rule 11 revision has been deferred until spring 1991, when the studies will be complete and available for
analysis. 3 13 Again, this method of deliberate consideration has prompted specu307. See supra notes 15-16, 190-93, 254, 275-91 and accompanying texts.

308. See Court Reform andAccess to JusticeAct: Hearingson H.R. 3152, supra note 18, at Parts
I & II (witness testimony and prepared statements); see infra note 310.
309. See supra notes 219-32.
310. Present at the Advisory Committee were Nan Aron of the Alliance for Justice; Alan Morrison of Public Citizen; and Laura Macklin, representing the Georgetown Law Center Institute for
Public Representation. Professor Macklin spoke on behalf of new openness principles. Among the
suggestions were a request for the Committee to create and distribute a long-term agenda for rule
revision, with participation by interested persons in creating that agenda; better advance notice of
meetings and enhanced participation in those meetings; circulation and distribution of early drafts of
proposed rule revisions before the drafts become set in stone, or are ready for wider distribution for
public hearings; and increased use of empirical studies of the federal rules. Morrison and Macklin
also spoke on behalf of further rule 11 revisions, arguing that the 1983 rule amendments, in addition
to having a disparate impact on civil rights and public interest litigants, are an impermissible feeshifting statute.
311. This request was made to the Federal Judicial Center, which is conducting its third study of
rule 11 sanctions. Tom Willging's latest study on rule 11 sanctioning patterns in selected district
courts is forthcoming in early 1991 and will be available for Advisory Committee use during its
spring 1991 meetings. In addition, the Federal Judicial Center is conducting a survey of district
court judges regarding rule 11 motions and sanctions, also to be completed by January 1991.
312. The Chair of the Advisory Committee, Judge John Grady, extended this invitation to the
interest group representatives present at the November Advisory Committee meeting. The author
was present at this meeting.
313. The decision to defer deliberation on rule 11 revision was tentatively agreed to at the November 1989 meeting, and reaffirmed at the June 1990 meeting. It was also agreed at the June 1990
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lation that lawyers and litigants frustrated with the application of rule 11 sanctioning power will take their case to Congress, as happened with rule 68.
There can be little doubt that further amendment of rule 11 is going to
generate tremendous controversy and political heat from the practicing bar. It is
a prime candidate to meet and surpass the Reporter's "decibel" test for referral
to Congress. Is the rule 11 sanctioning power a purely procedural rule that
should be promulgated through the deliberate considerations of the Advisory
Committee and judicial rulemaking process? Is rule 11, characterized as a feeshifting statute,3 14 a rule affecting substantive interests and therefore more properly in the purview of congressional legislation? Does rule 11 fall into that marginal area of federal rules where the substance-procedure distinction loses
meaning? It can be certain that in the ensuing months advocates will advance
variations of all these themes,_ without consensus or agreement. But the best
prophecy about rule 11 revision is that a retreat by the Advisory Committee
seems inevitable, with abdication to Congress to reformulate rule 11. The question, then, is not the political reality of this eventuality, but the wisdom of this
result.
CONCLUSION: TWILIGHT FOR THE ADVISORY COMMITrEE:

THE LAST HURRAH?

The purpose of this Article is to note a sea change of events in the rulemaking process, to observe an emerging trend in that process, and to speculate about

the potential impact of these changes. The movement for reform of the
rulemaking process is not new insofar as calls for democratization of that process have re-emerged cyclically as litigant interests have been affected by particular federal procedural rules. The difference with the past, however, is that open
judicial rulemaking is now the law and the Advisory Committee has entered a
new era of process. How the Advisory Committee adjusts to this new reality
will determine the continued importance and vitality of that body and ofjudicial
rulemaking in the future.
There has been a quiet but subtle change in rule reform efforts. The experience of the last ten years suggests that actors in the judicial arena have become
increasingly sophisticated concerning the opportunities for accomplishing advantageous rule reform through traditional lobbying efforts. Inside players now
know that they are playing a two-court game: if partisan politics fails to sway
the Advisory Committee concerning the wisdom of a particular rule modification, Congress is available to supply relief. Lobbying works in Congress. And
what is being learned in this two-court game is that Congress can be used effectively to shut down Advisory Committee deliberations.
The Advisory Committee faces a difficult dilemma. If it does not truly open
meeting to hold hearings on rule 11 and to hold an invited-witness hearing on rule 11 in February

1991.
314. See Tobias, supra note 22, at 306 (concerning fee-shifting legislation in relation to rule 11).
This theme was also repeated by the interest group representatives during discussion of rule 11 at the
November 1989 meeting of the Advisory Committee.
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its processes and meet the concerns of partisan petitioners, it seems destined to
be displaced in the rulemaking function by Congress, which will give succor to
those interest-group concerns. But if the Advisory Committ, - does capitulate to
lobbying, then it inevitably will compromise its traditional i )le as promulgator
of neutral rules of general applicability. In a sense, the seeds of destruction of
the old Advisory Committee system were sowed with the enhanced participation
provisions of the 1988 Judicial Improvements Act. The required new openness
may signal the last hurrah for Old Guard rulemaking.
To be sure, the Visigoths are not at the gate, but the lobbyists are. How one
feels about this sea change in the rulemaking process derives from one's view of
legislative lobbying 3 15 and the appropriate role of such lobbying in the judicial
rulemaking arena. Needless to say, the recent open rulemaking requirements
have not addressed the fundamental tension between philosophical theories regarding that rulemaking. 316 Is it possible to reconcile the view of neutral
rulemaking that disallows partisan advocacy with a view of partisan rulemaking
that believes there are no such things as neutral rules?
This conundrum has led to an anomaly. Ironically, advocates of participatory process advocate partisan rule revisions, all the while couching such
reform in the rhetoric of neutral rulemaking. Meanwhile, the Advisory Committee, giving continued lip service to traditional norms of trans-substantive procedure, actually pays great attention to constituent interests in particular rule
reforms. Thus, while espousing a philosophy of neutral rulemaking, the Advisory Committee recognizes and heeds constituent concerns; and while espousing
a theory of constituent concerns, open-process proponents nonetheless speak of
rules of general applicability that they hope will favor their interests.
There is a good deal of disingenuousness in the air. If it is true, as the
current Advisory Committee Reporter has written, that "we are all now Legal
Realists," '3 17 it would do a great deal to clear the air if all involved in the rule
reform process were more forthright about whose oxen are being gored or protected. After the air is cleared, this fresh setting might provide a good opportunity to reconsider who should make procedural rules and how this ought to be
accomplished. These are good questions worth debating. 3 18 But if the current
trend toward politicization of the rulemaking process continues, it seems likely
that these questions will be decided by default or politics.
Critics of the traditional judicial rulemaking process have caricatured that
process as an elitist function, carried on behind closed doors, shrouded in mystery, creating non-neutral rules infused with the biases of the elitist rulemakers.
315. There is vast political science literature on lobbying and interest group politics, but less
attention has been paid to judicial-branch lobbying and even less attention to lobbying judicial
rulemaking, a decidedly recent phenomenon. For a sample of the interest group literature, see the
sources cited supra note 251. The apparent lack of analysis ofjudicial lobbying probably stems from
the view that the third branch is the antimajoritarian branch, intended to be immunized from parti.
san politics.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 218-50.
317. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure,"supra note 1, at 287.
318. See Carrington, Making Rules, supra note 1, at 2113-15 (posing a similar set of questions
relating to revision of rule 56 on summary judgment).
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Proponents of the system have sought to portray the work of the Advisory Committee as a kind of abstract philosophical exercise, with solons operating behind
a veil of ignorance, creating rules of general applicability from an original, unbiased position. As is the nature of caricature, the portraits are overdrawn.
One of the constants in the history of rulemaking reform is the repeated
request from successive Advisory Committees that interested people attend Advisory Committee meetings, 3 19 a request that largely has gone unheeded. Committee meetings are open and in truth, the work of the Committee is tedious.
But attendance at the meetings would enlighten critics concerning the extent to
which Committee members debate rule revisions, regard comments on proposed
changes, and hew to theories of trans-substantive rulemaking.320 As is true for
much in the law, the reality of the judicial rulemaking process is somewhere in
the middle. Knowledge and experience of that process would reduce the decibel
level and enable rule reformers to proceed with their work.
319. The first open meeting of the Advisory Committee was in 1986. Id. at 2120 n.8.
320. The Reporter compiled comments of various individuals and groups for the June 1990 Ad-

visory Committee meeting about the proposed rule revision package. Among organizations and

individuals offering comments on various proposed rules were: the Public Citizen Litigation Group;

the Department of Justice; the Section of Business Law of the International Bar Association; the San
Francisco Bar; the National Association of Process Servers; the Securities and Exchange Commission; the National Wildlife Federation; the Philadelphia Bar Association; the Ohio Bar Association;
the American College of Trial Lawyers; the District Court of Maryland; the Washington State Bar;

the California Court Reporters Association; the National Shorthand Reporters Association; and
various law professors, practitioners, and federal judges.
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APPENDIX

Rule 25.1. Disclosure
32 1
Reporter's Draft Not Intended for Public Discussion

March 8, 1990
Reporter's Note
This draft embodies the idea that parties should disclose their own evidence
early and often. Its aim is [to] eliminate many motions, interrogatories and depositions. It would depend on an elevation of the professionalism of lawyers. The
basic idea is derived from Brazil, The Adversary Characterof Civil Discovery: A
Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1348 (1978), and
Schwarzer, The FederalRules, the Adversary Process,and Discovery Reform, 50
U. Prrr. L. REv. 703, 721-23 (1989). Some of the language originates in the
local rules of court in the Southern District of New York, the Central District of
California, and the Southern District of Florida.
This draft would not require, as several of the local court rules do, that
counsel have a meeting in every case. Meetings are encouraged "if feasible."
This draft contemplates significant revisions in the discovery rules occasioned by the reduced reliance on discovery to secure information. Except by
leave of court, interrogatories would be limited in number, perhaps to a number
as small as five or ten. Depositions presumptively would be limited in both
number and length.
(a) PROMPT DISCLOSURE.
(1) To secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
the action, each party has a duty promptly to disclose to every other
party:
(A) the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of any persons
known to have personal knowledge of any fact alleged in any pleading
filed in the action;
(B) the existence, location, custodian, and general description of
any tangible evidence or relevant documents, or information of a similar nature, bearing on any fact alleged in any pleading filed in the ac321. The current Reporter has continued his practice of labelling draft rules for the Advisory
Committee with the note "Reporter's Draft Not Intended for Public Discussion," as noted here.
Nevertheless, this draft version was made available to selected correspondents with the Reporter,
including the author and it also was available as part of the package of materials at the June 1990
Advisory Committee Meeting. The Advisory Committee and its individual members have taken no
action or position with regard to this draft rule as of the June 1990 Advisory Committee Meeting.
The draft rule included here is solely the work of the Reporter.
As indicated in the notes to this Article, the Reporter is disturbed by premature comments on
draft rules. See supra notes 3, 197. Nevertheless, the Reporter himself has commented on and made
available draft versions of his own efforts, in articles he has published prior to promulgation of a
rule. See Carrington, Making Rules, supra note 1 (Reporter's discussion of proposed revisions of
rule 56, including an Appendix with the draft rule). Although the Reporter has written on rule 56
revision and published a draft version of proposed changes in the summary judgment rule, the
Advisory Committee has yet to act on those revisions. The Reporter's Advisory Committee draft
version for rule 56 also carries the label "Reporter's Draft Not Intended for Public Discussion."
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tion and the identity of any such material to be used as exhibits at
depositions to be noticed by the disclosing party;
(C) the computation of any category of damage and the documents or other evidentiary material on which such a computation is
based; and
(D) the existence and contents of any insurance agreement
under which any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the
action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the
judgment.
(2)(A) The parties shall make the disclosure required by the preceding paragraph (a)(1) within 28 days after the filing of an answer to
the complaint. For cause, the court may shorten or extend this time.
(B) The duty prescribed in paragraph (1)(A) shall be a continuing duty, and each party shall make additional or amended disclosures
whenever new or different information is discovered or revealed. Such
additional or amended disclosures shall be served and filed within 14
days after the information is revealed to or discovered by the disclosing
party, but not later than 28 days before trial except by leave of court.
(b) PRETRIAL DISCLOSURE.
(1) In addition to the prompt disclosure, each party shall before
trial disclose to every other party the following information descriptive
of the evidence that the disclosing party will present in support of that
party's claim or defense:
(A) the names, addresses, and phone numbers of all witnesses
with a summary of the material facts to which each witness is expected
to testify;
(B) the substance of any expert opinion with a summary of the
basis for any such opinion and of the qualifications of any witness expected to present it, including a list of all prior expert appearances by
that witness that have occurred within the preceding three years; and
(C) the identity and location of any exhibits.
(2) Pretrial disclosure shall be made not later than 28 days
before trial, unless the court designates another time.
(c) FORM OF DISCLOSURES; MEETINGS; FILING. The
disclosures required by this rule shall be made in writing signed by the
party or counsel certifying that the disclosure is complete. If feasible,
counsel shall meet to exchange disclosures; otherwise, the disclosures
shall be served as provided by Rule 5. All disclosures shall be
promptly filed with the court.
(d) NO DISCOVERY OF INFORMATION REQUIRED TO
BE DISCLOSED. No discovery of matters required to be disclosed
shall be necessary to secure the information, and a party shall be protected against such discovery as provided in subdivisions (c) and (g) of
Rule 26 except that an opposing party shall be entitled pursuant to
Rule 30 to depose prior to trial any witness identified by the disclosing
party.
(e) EXCLUSION OF UNDISCLOSED EVIDENCE. In addi-
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tion to any other sanction the court may employ, the court shall exclude at trial any evidence offered by a party that was not timely
disclosed as required by this rule. No party shall be permitted to examine that party's witness to prove facts other than those identified in
the pretrial disclosure to the party's opponents, nor shall any expert
witness be allowed to testify to an opinion or a basis for an opinion that
was not timely disclosed, except by leave of court granted upon a
showing of cause.
(f) MISLEADING DISCLOSURE. A party who makes a disclosure pursuant to this rule that the party knew or should have
known was inaccurate and thereby misleads an opposing party to engage in substantial unnecessary investigation or discovery shall be ordered by the court to rei[m]burse the opposing party for the cost,
including attorneys' fees, of such unnecessary investigation or discovery and may be subject to other appropriate sanctions as the court may
direct.
ADVISORY COMMrITEE NOTE

The rule is entirely new. Its purpose is to reduce materially the cost of
discovery before trial. It is based on significant experience with local rules of
court.
Discovery practice has become encumbered with excess motion practice
and other papers to such an extent that Rules 26-37 are no longer consonant
with the aims of the rules stated in Rule 1. It is the aim of this rule to eliminate
much of the excess paper by calling upon the professional responsibility of the
bar to substitute informal methods of exchanging information for more costly
formal methods. The information required to be disclosed could be secured by
adversaries under existing practice through the use of interrogatories or other

discovery devices.
SUBDIVISION (a). Paragraph (1) establishes a duty of prompt disclosure of
information that is customarily secured at the outset of litigation through formal
discovery. The subparagraphs specify the information to be disclosed and serve
in the manner of standard interrogatories.
Subparagraph (1)(D) replaces Paragraph (b)(2) of Rule 26. As with the
former rule, the requirement of disclosure does not render the information admissible in evidence, and the duty of disclosure is limited to the insurance agreement, not including any application forms that may contain personal
information.
Subparagraph (2)(A) sets tl~e time for initial disclosures. That time is selected as the earliest occasion on which an exchange of information can be made
with fairness to both sides. If the matter is one requiring expedited disposition,
the court may shorten the time. If there are other parties belatedly served who
would gain an unfair advantage or who might be unfairly disadvantaged by premature disclosures, the court may extend the time.
Subparagraph (2)(B) provides that the duty to disclose is a continuing duty.
The same concept is expressed in more general terms in Rule 26(e).

1991]

INFORMAL DISCOVERY

SUBDIVISION (b). Paragraph (1) establishes an additional duty to disclose
information that is customarily secured before trial by means of discovery or at a
final pretrial conference held under Rule 16(d). In some cases, a full exchange
as required will obviate the need for such a conference, or cause it to be much
shorter than if the court is required to participate in the exchange.
This rule effectively requires parties to designate experts far enough in advance that the opposing parties have a reasonable opportunity to prepare a
rebuttal.
SUBDIVISION (C). This subdivision prescribes the form of disclosures. A
writing is required to assure the parties and counsel are mindful of the solemnity
of the obligations imposed; a signature on such a disclosure is a certification
that it is complete and an undertaking to correct it promptly if [n]ew information comes to light.
An informal meeting of counsel is the preferred method of exchanging the

required information. This may not in all cases be feasible. In any event, the
written disclosures shall be filed with the court.
SUBDIVISION (d). This precludes discovery that is redundant to disclosure
under this rule. Because the purpose of this rule is to eliminate needless discovery, the court should protect parties from redundant discovery. Moreover, a
party seeking redundant discovery should bear any resulting costs as provided in
Rule 26(g).
SUBDIVISION (e). This subdivision provides the primary enforcement
mechanism for this rule, the exclusion of evidence not disclosed. A party seeking to hide information in order to surprise an opponent at trial is exposed to the
likely consequence that the trap set will be prevented from working by action of
the court.
The sanction of exclusion of evidence is not alone adequate to meet all possible situations arising in the operation of the rule. A Party may also proceed
under Rule 37 in an appropriate case.
SUBDIVISION ([fl). This subdivision imposes restraint on parties tempted to
over-disclose or bury the opposing parties with an excess of information, as by
listing many persons as possible witnesses whom the disclosing party knows or
should know to have no useful information.

